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CONTEMPLATED AMENDMENTS TO JAPAN’S 1947
CONSTITUTION: A RETURN TO IYE, KOKUTAI AND
THE MEIJI STATE
Carl F. Goodman
INTRODUCTION
The post World War II American Occupation of Japan was a huge
programmatic success. Its disarmament,1 repatriation,2 land reform,3 and
health programs4 put a defeated Japan on the road to recuperation, while
providing a military shield that enabled Japan to focus on recovery from the
War and rebuilding the country and economy.5 Perhaps its most enduring
legacy was its Enlightenment-based, American-drafted, rights-oriented
Constitution of 1947 [hereinafter “the Constitution”].6 Drafted in English,
the Constitution was promulgated in Japanese, resulting in some substantive
changes. Among the most important of these were changing the English

1
See GEOFFREY PERRET, OLD SOLDIERS NEVER DIE 495 (1996); GEORGE DAVIES, THE
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 293–94 (2001); LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, JAPAN: ARTICLE 9 OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2006), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/japan-constitution-article9.pdf.
2
By 1949 over 6 million Japanese had been repatriated to Japan. Paul J. Mueller, Occupied Japan -A Progress Report, U.S. ARMY (Aug. 27, 2007), http://www.army.mil/article/4613/.
3
See Toshihiko Kawagoe, Agricultural Land Reform in Postwar Japan: Experiences and Issues 32
(World
Bank
Policy
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
2111,
1999),
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2111;
Tsutomu
Takigawa,
Historical
Background of Agricultural Land Reform in Japan, 10 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 290, 290 (1972),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1972.tb00283.x/pdf; MIKISO HANE & LOUIS G.
PEREZ, MODERN JAPAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 371 (4th ed. 2009); HOWARD B. SCHONBERGER,
AFTERMATH OF WAR: AMERICANS AND THE REMAKING OF JAPAN, 1945–1952, at 65–66 (1989); WILLIAM
MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR, 508–509 (1978); PERRET, supra note 1, at 520–521; Masahiro Takada,
Japan’s Economic Miracle: Underlying Factors and Strategies for the Growth (Mar. 23, 1999) (unpublished
student research paper, Lehigh University) (on file with Professor Raymond F. Wylie, Lehigh University),
http://www.lehigh.edu/~rfw1/courses/1999/spring/ir163/Papers/pdf/mat5.pdf.
4
See Crawford F. Sams, Experiences in Immunization Against Tuberculosis with BCG Vaccine in
Japan, 44 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 903, 903–908 (1954); Sey Nishimura, Promoting Health During the
American Occupation of Japan: The Public Health Section, Kyoto Military Government Team, 19451949,
98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 424, 424–434 (2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2253585/;
SETH G. JONES ET AL., SECURING HEALTH: LESSONS FROM NATION-BUILDING MISSIONS 61–64 (2006)
(ebook); SEYMOUR MORRIS JR., SUPREME COMMANDER: MACARTHUR’S TRIUMPH IN JAPAN 102–114
(2014); MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 509; DAVIES, supra note 1, at 296.
5
Japan and the Occupation received assistance from an unexpected source—the North Korean
invasion of South Korea jump-started the Japanese economy.
6
While drafted by the Kades Committee set up by the Occupation, the drafting was influenced by
indigenous Japanese drafts. THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN’S DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
60–61, 98–99 (2000).
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word “people” into the Japanese “kokumin” (Japanese citizens)7 and
transmuting many definitive rights into more passive language.8
Many in Japan’s political leadership seek to change the Americandrafted Constitution by bringing it closer to the indigenous Japanese postwar
draft (Matsumoto draft) that was seen by the American Occupation
[hereinafter “the Occupation”] as containing merely minor amendments to
the pre-war Meiji Constitution. The 1947 Constitution’s Amendments
Clause requires a two-thirds majority of both the Lower and Upper House
before an amendment can be presented to the public for a referendum vote.
At referendum each amendment must be voted on separately, a simple
majority is required for passage.9 In 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) (Japan’s dominant party) was formed through a merger of the postwar
Liberal and Democratic Parties brokered by Yoshida Shigeru, Hatoyama
Ichiro, and Kishi Nobusuke to respond to the merger of Japan’s left wing
Socialist leaning parties, and to try to achieve a conservative two-thirds
majority in both Diet Houses.10 The LDP, while Japan’s dominant political
party since 1955, never achieved the two-thirds majority needed. In Abe’s
second term as Prime Minister, the LDP obtained a two-thirds majority in
the Lower House and together with small parties favoring constitutional
amendment, obtained a two-thirds majority in the Upper House that supports
some amendment—Prime Minister Abe (Kishi's grandson) is pressing for
constitutional amendment in 2017.11

7

See STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMM., DECISION AMENDING SWNCC 228: REFORM OF
JAPANESE
GOVERNMENTAL
SYSTEM
(Jan.
7,
1946),
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/059/059tx.html; Memorandum from Charles L. Kades, Chief,
Pub.
Admin.
Div.,
to
Chief,
Gov’t
Section,
2
(Feb.
12,
1946),
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/002_15/002_15_001l.html (last updated Mar. 21, 2013). The
Meiji Constitution’s rights provisions were also limited to Japanese citizens. HAROLD S. QUIGLEY,
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 52–53 (1932); HIROBUMI ITO, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN 38–40 (Miyoji Ito ed. 1979) (1889).
8
See KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR’S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 7380 (1991).
9
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [hereinafter “KENPŌ”] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96 (Japan). The Referendum Law
provides that majority means majority of votes cast, although question exists as to whether majority
requires a majority of eligible voters. Motonari Imaseki, Act Concerning Procedures to Revise the
Constitution of Japan, in WASEDA U. INST. COMP. L.: JAPANESE L. INFO. (Mar. 15, 2008),
http://www.waseda.jp/hiken/en/jalaw_inf/new_leg/001imaseki.html.
10
WATANABE TSUNEO, JAPAN’S BACKROOM POLITICS: FACTIONS IN A MULTIPARTY AGE 239–41
(Robert D. Eldridge trans. 2013) (1967).
11
The supermajority requirement helps assure basic human rights and structural democracy rights in
the face of emotions at a particular point in time. The LDP’s contemplated amendments would do away
with supermajority protection of democracy and people’s rights. David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism,
47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 192 (2013). The Meiji Constitution’s amendment provision required a.
presentation by the Emperor to the Diet and b. supermajority provisions for both quorum and vote
requirements in the Diet. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [hereinafter “MEIJI KENPŌ”] [CONSTITUTION], art. 73
THE
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The Constitution’s Renunciation of War Clause has long been the face
of the LDP’s constitutional amendment drive, but the LDP has much more
on its amendment plate.12 Indeed, because of the Cabinet Declaration of
2014 that reinterpreted Article 9 to allow Japan to engage in “collective Self
Defense” and subsequent legislative and administrative changes designed to
carry out collective self-defense with the United States, it is likely that
“formal amendment” of Article 9 will take a back seat to other amendments
on the LDP’s list.
This paper discusses some major amendments the LDP is
contemplating and examines the interaction of amendments that makes them
more than separate proposals. The terms of amendments that will be
submitted to the Diet will be determined through discussions between
Japan’s political parties. However, enough is known to examine how the
changes contemplated permit legislative and/or executive action restricting
the rights of the Japanese people opening the door to returning Japanese
society to its pre-war autocratic Meiji Constitution past. This paper
examines the amendments with an eye on Japanese history, customs, and
law.13
Part I briefly discusses Japan's constitutional history. Part II discusses
how contemplated amendments to the Preamble, Emperor provisions,
individuality, the family, and free speech and association could affect
Japanese law and society. Part III presents a short summary.

(Japan). Hirobumi Ito justified such stringency by pointing out the special nature of a Constitution.
HIROBUMI ITO, supra note 7, at 153–55.
12
KENPŌ, art. 9 (“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as
means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the
state will not be recognized.”).
13
For English language translation of portions of the LDP’s 2012 draft constitution, see Jiyumintô,
Shinkenpô
sôan
[New
Draft
Constitution],
Oct.
28,
2005,
at
www.jimin.jp/jimin/shin_kenpou/shiryou/pdf/051028_a.pdf [hereinafter LDP Draft]; Young Lawyer's
Association for The Future of Freedom translation of 2012 draft proposal, (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.asuno-jiyuu.com/2013/11/blog-post.html; Voices of Overseas Youth for Civic Engagement,
Draft for the Amendment of the Constitution of Japan, VOYCE (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.voycejpn.com/ldp-draft-constitution; Colin P.A. Jones, The LDP constitution, article by article: a preview of
TIMES,
Jul.
2,
2013,
things
to
come?,
JAPAN
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2013/07/02/issues/the-ldp-constitution-a-preview-of-things-tocome/#.Vp-RNIf2bIV; Lawrence Repeta, Japan’s Democracy at Risk – The LDP’s Ten Most Dangerous
Proposals for Constitutional Change, 11 ASIA-PAC. J. JAPAN FOCUS 28, 3 (2013),
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lawrence-Repeta/3969.
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With his victory at the Battle of Sekigahara (October 1600),
Tokugawa Ieyasu defeated the forces of Western Japan who supported the
son of Toyotomi Hideoshi, the man who unified Japan during the 16th
Century. In 1603, the Emperor granted Tokugawa the title of Shogun and
the Tokugawa clan then ruled Japan for the next two and a half centuries.
The arrival of American war ships under the command of Commodore Perry
(July 1853) who demanded trade ties between Japan and the United States—
a demand that the Tokugawa regime lacked the power to resist—together
with built up animosity, especially in Western Japan, eventually led to civil
war in which the rebels rallied under the demand for restoration of the
Emperor’s power. In 1868, the Emperor announced the restoration of his
power (Meiji Restoration) and effective rule passed to Western Japan
Samurai, principally from Satsuma and Chosen Han. Dispute arose as to
whether a constitution should be promulgated. The Emperor had promised
in his Charter Oath of Five Articles (1868) that there would be “deliberative
assemblies” but the abolition of the pre restoration feudal structure abolished
feudal councils that could serve this purpose. A constitutionally created
legislative body was seen as the means for carrying out the promise of
deliberative assemblies.14 By 1879, an agreement was reached between the
competing camps, and ten years later, the Emperor granted his subjects
Japan’s first modern constitution,15 the Constitution of the Empire of Japan16
(hereinafter “Meiji Constitution”). Ito Hirabumi, the principle author of the
Meiji Constitution, specifically rejected the liberal American model of
governance and instead chose a conservative German model.17 Seeking to

14

JOHN K. FAIRBANK, EDWIN O. REISCHAUER & ALBERT M. CRAIG, EAST ASIA TRADITION AND
TRANSFORMATION 503, 535 (1973).
15
The Seventeen Article Constitution of Prince Shotoku written in the very early 7th century is
reputed to be the first constitutional document of Japan. Unlike constitutional documents in the West, it did
not set forth rights vis-à-vis the government but rather was Confucian in nature, setting forth ethical and
moral standards of conduct. While referred to as a constitution, it was neither supreme law nor would it be
considered ‘law’ in a Western sense. DAVID J. LU, JAPAN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 22–23 (1997).
16
See 42 ASIATIC SOC'Y OF JAPAN, JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS, 1, 8 n.1 (W.W. McLaren
ed. 1979) (1914).
17
See QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 39–40, 44; E. HERBERT NORMAN, INT'L SECRETARIAT INST. OF PAC.
RELATIONS, FEUDAL BACKGROUND OF JAPANESE POLITICS: SECRETARIAT PAPER NO. 9, at 90–98 (1945),
microformed on Chapter IV The Autocratic State (Univ. Microfilms Int'l 1978); IAN BURUMA, INVENTING
JAPAN: 1853-1964, at 52–54 (2003); CARL F. GOODMAN, JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN 64
(2004).
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thread a needle between the Emperor as supreme power in the State and the
Emperor as a constitutional monarch (consistent with evolving international
doctrine), Ito wrote both theories into the Constitution.18
While the Meiji Constitution contained a listing of “Rights and Duties
of Subjects,” these rights were not self-executing, and rather required
legislation that defined the scope and limitations of the granted rights.19 The
Meiji Constitution allowed a form of democracy but did not compel it. It
appears similar to Westminister Democracy, but is different because
Ministers of State were advisors to and served at the discretion of the
Emperor; they were neither appointed by nor dependent on 20 the confidence
of the Diet.21 Moreover, the Cabinet acted on a consensus basis so that if a
single Cabinet Minister dissented or resigned, the Cabinet would be
dissolved and a new Cabinet appointed by the Emperor. Since the army and
navy were entitled to two seats on the Cabinet that, by regulation, could only
be held by active duty senior officers, the military was in a commanding
position.22 Military Chiefs of Staff, like their Cabinet Minister counterparts,
were responsible solely to the Emperor and not to the Cabinet or military
officers serving as Cabinet Ministers. Commanders in the field held
allegiance to their Chief of Staff, not to the civil government or the military
appointees serving in the Cabinet, leading to a breakdown in rank discipline
that spread throughout the ranks, including mid-level officers. Within the
military there were “constitutional” disagreements—Chiefs of Staff
considered the Cabinet and the military’s representatives serving in the


18
See, e.g., MEIJI KENPŌ, art. 3 (“The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.”); id. art. 4 (“The Emperor
is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to
the provisions of the present Constitution.”); id. art. 5 (“The Emperor exercises the legislative power with
the consent of the Imperial Diet.”); id. art. 9 (“The Emperor issues or causes to be issued, the Ordinances
necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the
promotion of the welfare of the subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing
laws.”); STEPHEN S. LARGE, EMPERORS OF THE RISING SUN: THREE BIOGRAPHIES 43 (1997).
19
See, e.g., MEIJI KENPŌ, art. 23 (“No Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried or punished,
unless according to law.”); id. art. 28 (“Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and
order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.”); id. art. 29
(“Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public
meetings and associations.”).
20
Id. art. 55, para. 1 (“The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and
be responsible for it.”).
21
See HIROBUMI ITO, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN 102–05
(Miyoji Ito trans., Chū-ō Daigaku ed. 1906) (1889).
22
LARGE, supra note 18, at 42.
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Cabinet as lacking authority over operational matters and thus not having
authority over the Chiefs of Staff.23
The Meiji Constitution could be interpreted as granting freedoms and
might be interpreted to allow a responsible representative government.
Some in pre-war Japan argued for such an interpretation but the reality was
that the Meiji Constitution was not interpreted to grant rights that could not
be infringed by legislation nor did the elected branch of the Diet control the
selection of the prime minister. Dissenters among the Meiji Revolutionaries
either resigned or were forced out of government and formed political
parties.
B.
Restrictions on Constitutional Rights During the Short Lived Taisho
Democracy Period
After the death of Emperor Meiji and the accession of Emperor
Taisho, a period of so-called Taisho Democracy came into existence in
Japan. During this period, which flourished in the 1920s but lasted a mere
eight to twelve years, there were some democratic stirrings and political
party dominated governments, but basic freedoms such as freedom of
speech, association, and the press were, for the most part, unavailable to the
Japanese public.24 An amended Peace Preservation Law, an update and
modification of the laws that restricted freedom of speech and association
that had been adopted in the interregnum between the Restoration and
adoption of the Constitution,25 sharply restricted freedom of speech and
assembly as an antidote to the Universal Male Suffrage Law.26
In the post-Taisho period (1930s), the “organ theory” or the idea that
the Emperor was a constitutional monarch subject to the Constitution,27 was
rejected in favor of Kokutai, the theory that the Emperor was the essence of
the State and that all Japanese people held a relationship to the Kami of
Shinto religion and to the Emperor through the Kami.28 Professor Minobe, a
strong supporter of the organ theory, was physically attacked and compelled

23

W.G. BEASLEY, THE RISE OF MODERN JAPAN 171–72 (3d ed. 2000) (1990).
Alternating political party governments served from 1925 to 1932. LARGE, supra note 18, at 109.
25
See BURUMA, supra note 17, at 48–49, 54–55.
26
See Richard H. Mitchell, Japan’s Peace Preservation Law of 1925: Its Origins and Significance,
in 28 MONUMENTA NIPPONICA 317, 317–345 (1973).
27
See Kenneth Colegrove, The Japanese Emperor, 26 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 642, 648–653 (1932).
28
See generally ROBERT S. ELLWOOD & RICHARD PILGRIM, JAPANESE RELIGION: A CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE (1985) (noting that kami spirits not only adhere to the natural world but also to the original
Japanese clans, each of which had its own kami—the most important of which was the kami for the
Imperial clan).
24
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to resign from his position at Tokyo University and from the Diet’s Upper
House,29 notwithstanding the Emperor’s support of his theory.30
C.

The Occupation’s Constitutional Objectives and the 1947 Constitution

To the Occupation [SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Powers)
which, while it applied to General MacArthur was how the Occupation was
referred to], whose marching orders were contained in the Potsdam
Declaration and a joint War and State Department policy paper (Initial Post
Surrender Policy Directive for Japan31 and its revisions),32 the constitution
Japan needed was not one that could be interpreted to allow for individual
rights and a democratic representative form of government; it was one that
required a representative democracy and recognition of basic human rights.
The Occupation sought a Japanese-drafted constitution centered on
gender equality, representative democracy, and freedom of thought, speech
and religion.33 Prime Minster Shidehara turned to a committee headed by
Matsumoto Joji, whose draft was considered by the Occupation as an
inadequate minor amendment to the Meiji Constitution.34 When the
Matsumoto draft was made public it was doomed, as it not only failed to
represent the Occupation’s goals, but also failed to conform to Japanese
public opinion, which sought a real change from the Meiji Constitution that
would grant freedoms to the public.35 What the Occupation (and the

29
For a portion of Minobe’s defense, see 2 SOURCES OF JAPANESE TRADITION 239–246 (Ryusaku
Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore De Bary & Donald Keene eds., text ed. 1964). For a discussion of the Minobe
Affair and its free-speech and military vs. civil authority aspects, see GREGORY J. KASZA, THE STATE AND
THE MASS MEDIA IN JAPAN, 1918–1945, at 129–137 (1988); MARIUS B. JANSEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN
JAPAN 597 (2000); BEASLEY, supra note 24, at 184–186. For a discussion of the change in orthodoxy that
led to Minobe’s downfall, see Christopher Goto-Jones, The Way of Revering the Emperor: Imperial
Philosophy and Bushidō in Modern Japan, in THE EMPERORS OF MODERN JAPAN 23, 35–36 (Ben-Ami
Shillony ed., 2008).
30
LARGE, supra note 18, at 155.
31
See Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan, State Department Bulletin (Sept. 23, 1945); United
States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC150/4), Memorandum from H. Freeman Matthews
to
the
State-War-Navy
Coordinating
Committee
(Sep.
6,
1945),
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/022/022tx.html.
32
See State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Decision Amending SWNCC 228: Reform of the
Japanese
Government
System
(Jan.
7,
1946),
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/059/059_005l.html.
33
Charles L. Kades, The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution, 104 Pol. Sci. Q.
215, 219 (1989).
34
Memorandum from Charles L. Kades to the Chief, Government Section (Feb. 12, 1946),
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/002_15/002_15_001l.html.
35
David S. Law, The Myth of Imposed Constitutionalism in Japan, in SOCIAL AND POL.
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 25557 (Dennis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013).
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Japanese public) wanted was a constitution that protected individual rights.36
General MacArthur turned the creation of a roadmap for a constitution over
to General Whitney of SCAP’s government section, giving him general
instructions: a powerless Emperor; no military, whether for defensive or
offensive purposes; elimination of remnants of feudalism; and a reformed
budget process. Whitney turned the matter over to Colonel Kades who was
given one week to prepare a road map for a Constitution. Kades was to be
guided by the latest version of the joint War/State Department policy paper
for the Occupation, now known as SWNCC 228, the Potsdam Declaration
and MacArthur’s summary instructions.37
The Kades’ committee draft, after some modifications and changes
suggested by the Japanese government and others, brought about by virtue
of translation from English to Japanese, was presented by the Emperor to the
Diet. SCAP agreed to select modifications suggested by the Japanese
government and accepted few suggestions made by the Far East
Commission. Some translation “errors” in the Japanese government's
translation of the Kades draft that were caught and rejected by the
Occupation would have subordinated constitutional individual rights to
legislation, retained some imperial powers, and allowed executive rule in
emergency situations.38 As set forth in greater detail in Part II hereof, the
LDP’s proposed amendments under consideration in this paper could have
the effect of subordinating constitutional rights to legislation, give powers to
the Emperor and would provide for emergency powers that could, at least
temporarily, displace democracy in favor of rule by Cabinet orders that must
be obeyed by the public.
The 1947 Constitution retains a dynastic Emperor as a symbol of the
State, places sovereignty solely in the People, renounces war, and gives the
judicial branch the power of constitutional judicial review. In addition, it
provides for a representative democracy where the executive is appointed by
and subject to retention by confidence of an elected legislative branch. The
Constitution seeks to remove the vestiges of feudalism through structural
changes in the governing system and the numerous rights granted to the
Japanese people. The requirement for supermajority consent of the

36
See TAKESHI MASUDA, SOFT POWER AND ITS PERILS: U.S. CULTURAL POLICY IN EARLY POSTWAR
JAPAN AND PERMANENT DEPENDENCY 21718 (2007).
37
KOSEKI SHOOICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 79 (Ray A. Moore ed., 1997);
Kades, supra note 33; ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT LOOKS
BACK (1976); JANSEN, supra note 29; PETER J. HERZOG, JAPAN’S PSEUDO-DEMOCRACY (1993).
38
DALE M. HELLEGERS, WE, THE JAPANESE PEOPLE: WORLD WAR II AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 540, (2002).
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legislative branch, plus majority consent of the people for constitutional
amendment, was designed to create a legislative branch supermajority hurdle
that would protect the Constitution from intemperate changes, while
requiring consent of the people through direct referendum of any changes
suggested by elected leaders. While the Occupation stated it was not forcing
acceptance of its draft, it also stated it was prepared to submit the basic ideas
of its draft directly to the Japanese people if the government rejected them
and held out the prospect of charging the Emperor as a war criminal if the
Constitution was rejected.39
The Emperor submitted the Constitution to the Diet as an amendment
of the Meiji Constitution. After some amendments (accepted by the
Occupation) made during Diet consideration, it was approved and has never
been subject to formal amendment.
II.

THE LDP’S CONTEMPLATED AMENDMENTS

A.

Granting the Cabinet the Power to Govern by Cabinet Order in a
Prime Minister Declared Emergency

Under the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor could, in cases of urgent
necessity arising when the Diet was not in session, issue imperial ordinances
that had the force and effect of law but needed to be confirmed by the Diet
when it returned.40 This power was used to stifle freedom of speech and the
press when capital punishment and life imprisonment for forming or joining
an organization that sought to change Kokutai (even by peaceful means)
were added to the Peace Preservation Law by emergency order.41 The 1947
Constitution made the legislative branch the supreme organ of the State and
has no emergency provision. The Diet is the only branch whose entire
membership is elected to enable it to represent all the people.42 The
proposed amendment to grant the Cabinet the power to govern by Cabinet

Kades, supra note 33, at 215, 229232.
Article 8 of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (MEIJI KENPŌ) provided “Article 8. The
Emperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities,
issues, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial Ordinances in the place of law. (2) Such Imperial
Ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve
the said Ordinances, the Government shall declare them to be invalid for the future.” Diet sessions were
only three months long and the Emperor was under no duty to call the Diet back into session during an
emergency. See Colegrove, supra note 27, at 642, 655.
41
QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 5859; KASZA, supra note 29, at 45 (Kasza notes that the Emergency
Power was exercised on four occasions to restrict press freedom – pg. 13); Colegrove, supra note 27, at
642, 658659 (1932).
42
KENPŌ art. 41, 43.
39
40
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order in an emergency declared by the Prime Minister is seen by the LDP as
noncontroversial and easily acceptable by a populous still traumatized by the
Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami.43
The LDP’s considered amendment harkens back to the Meiji
Constitution’s grant of power to the Emperor and would allow the Cabinet,
after a Prime Minister declared emergency, to rule via Cabinet orders having
the effect of law and would compel people in Japan to carry out orders
issued by the State (and subordinate agencies of the State).44 It appears the
amendment will be presented as a minor change that would allow the
government to call the Diet back in session in the event of an emergency, but
it is far more.45 The Constitution already allows the Cabinet to call special
Diet sessions and twenty-five percent of the membership of either House of

43
The LDP has been considering making the emergency clause amendment the first in a series of
rolling amendments to be placed before the Diet. The public, believing this amendment will be easy to
achieve, will make the process of amendment publicly acceptable and “normal,” thus paving the way for
other amendments that are seen as potentially more polarizing. However, the recent unprecedented address
by the Emperor, in which he hinted at his desire to retire (abdicate) in favor of his eldest son and the failure
of the Constitution to provide for abdication, has led some to believe that a constitutional amendment may
be required to allow abdication (although it can reasonably be argued that all that is needed is a change in
the Imperial Household Law). Should the LDP conclude that an abdication amendment is required, then
such an amendment would probably be the first amendment to be debated by the Diet and presented to the
public. Allowing abdication is contentious as there is some objection to permitting the Emperor to
abdicate. Considering an abdication amendment may open the door to simultaneous consideration of
amendments dealing with the Emperor that the LDP is contemplating, and that may implicate the question
of succession. This is a very contentious issue, as the failure to find agreement among LDP factions on how
to deal with the succession crisis that loomed prior to the birth of a male heir to the Emperor’s youngest
son. All of which could set back Prime Minister Abe’s schedule and time table for Constitutional
Amendment. See Anna Fifield, Japan’s Emperor Wants to Retire: Is He Allowed To?, WASH. POST (Aug.
6,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japans-emperor-wants-to-retire-is-heallowed-to/2016/08/05/12199b6c-58d7-11e6-8b48-0cb344221131_story.html; see also, Full Text of
(Aug.
8,
2016),
Emperor
Akihito's
Video
Message,
MAINICHI
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160808/p2a/00m/0na/008000c; Opinion, Abdication Could Pose Legal
(Aug.
8,
2016),
Challenges
for
Imperial
System,
MAINICHI
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160808/p2g/00m/0dm/073000c; Elaine Lies, Japan Emperor
Abdication Debate Could Stir Discussion on Female Succession, REUTERS (July 14, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-emperor-idUSKCN0ZU0AE.
44
Lawrence Repeta, Japan’s Democracy at Risk – The LDP’s Ten Most Dangerous Proposals for
Constitutional Change, 11 ASIA-PAC. J. JAPAN FOCUS 28, 3 (2013), http://www.japanfocus.org/-LawrenceRepeta/3969; Colin P.A. Jones, The LDP constitution, article by article: a preview of things to come?,
JAPAN TIMES (July 2, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2013/07/02/issues/the-ldpconstitution-a-preview-of-things-to-come/#.Vp-RNIf2bIV; Voices of Overseas Youth for Civic
Engagement, Draft for the Amendment of the Constitution of Japan, VOYCE, http://www.voycejpn.com/ldp-draft-constitution (contemplated new Articles 98 and 99).
45
LDP Proposes Prioritizing Debate on Contingencies in Revising Constitution, MAINICHI (May 8,
2015), http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150508p2a00m0na010000c.html.
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the Diet may require the Cabinet to decide whether to hold such a session.46
In times of national emergency, when the Diet has been dissolved, the
Cabinet may call the Upper House back into emergency session to enact
provisional measures that become permanent only if approved within 10
days of the Lower House returning.47 The LDP’s contemplated proposal
contains what James Madison characterized as the seeds of “tyranny,” by
combining the legislative, judicial, and executive power in the hands of a
small select group. 48 The Cabinet as specified in the proposal, requires only
a bare majority of members be elected officials, and all members must be
appointed by and serve at the Prime Minister’s pleasure.49
The Diet can expand the definition of “emergency” beyond the
already broad circumstances established in the LDP proposal. Expansions
could result from armed attacks, social disorder from internal insurrections
or other reasons, or natural disasters. Moreover, the LDP contemplated
proposal, consistent with emergency amendments designed to increase the
power of a ruling elite,50 contains few limits on actions of the “Emergency
Cabinet.”51 Strikingly, none of the protections that modern democracies use
to cabin an Emergency Clause are present in the LDP proposal.52

46
KENPŌ art. 53 (“The Cabinet may determine to convoke extraordinary sessions of the Diet. When
a quarter or more of the total members of either House makes the demand, the Cabinet must determine on
such convocation.”)
47
Id, at 54, para. 23 “When the House of Representatives is dissolved, the House of Councillors
[sic] is closed at the same time. However, the Cabinet may in time of national emergency convoke the
House of Councillors [sic] in emergency session. Measures taken at such session as mentioned in the
proviso of the preceding paragraph shall be provisional and shall become null and void unless agreed to by
the House of Representatives within a period of ten days after the opening of the next session of the Diet.”
48
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
49
KENPŌ art. 68, para. 23 “The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. However, a
majority of their number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet. The Prime Minister may
remove the Ministers of State as he chooses.”
50
Christian Bjørnskov & Stefan Voigt, The Determinants of Emergency Constitutions 1728, 31
(Mar. 23, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2697144.
51
See Voices of Overseas Youth for Civic Engagement, supra note 44; Jones, supra note 44.
52
The contemplated clause does not do any of the following: separate the declaring authority from
the executing authority (the Prime Minister declares an emergency and his handpicked Cabinet executes the
emergency powers); require the legislative Branch immediately to be called into session to approve or
reject the declaration, and remain in session to review future Cabinet Orders; list freedoms that are exempt
from Executive limitations; provide judicial review of the declaration or actions taken there under. The
contemplated clause also does not distinguish between emergencies and situations needed when the
existence of the State is threatened (e.g., war launched against Japan), and those that may require short term
immediate action, such as natural disasters. It also does not define the reason why a Declaration is required
(e.g., to uphold the democratic rights of the public), nor does it protect human rights or democracy. See
OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 4046, 5463 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2006).
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Catastrophes, such as the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, could
have been sufficient to set aside democratic rule. Perhaps an oil embargo,
such as the pre-Pacific War American Embargo53 or a suspension of oil
supply from the Persian Gulf, which would endanger the public’s right to
pursue happiness might also be sufficient. Indeed, any action that might
impede happiness, an incredibly broad category, would appear sufficient.54
In these cases, the Constitution would not limit the Cabinet’s authority
to enforce orders that are narrowly tailored to address the declared
emergency. Their authority would not be limited to employing the least
restrictive effect on its citizens’ rights. There is no prohibition against the
Prime Minister declaring new emergencies as old emergencies expire.55
During a State of Emergency, the public would be required to carry out the
instructions of the State.56 While the LDP draft would require “respect” be
given to fundamental human rights, “respect” is a state of mind, rather than a
prohibition. Government can respect freedom of speech, but nonetheless
prohibit it in circumstances where it deems appropriate. As such, the
government can give respect by considering the effect of the emergency
actions on citizens’ rights, but nonetheless, conclude that the Cabinet’s order
and its limiting effect on the fundamental human rights is necessary. In

53
The United States was a major exporter of oil to Japan both before and after Japan’s invasion of
China in 1937. Having previously abrogated the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1911), in July 1940
United States passed the Export Control Act requiring licenses for shipments of critical war materials.
Then the United States effectively embargoed the shipment of high octane aircraft fuel and other products
important for Japan’s war effort. In response, Japan was able to import low octane fuel and then raise the
octane level to aviation quality. In July 1941, in response to Japan’s occupation of southern French
Indochina, the United States froze all Japanese assets in the United States and put in place a “hard
embargo” against all oil shipments to Japan. KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR THE WAR PRESIDENT, 19401943
262265 (2000); Oil – Oil and World Power, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEW AMERICAN NATION,
http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Oil-Oil-and-world-power.html; 5 AM. J. OF INT’L L. No. 2
at 100106; W.H.M., Economic Warfare with Japan or a New Treaty?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan. 1940),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/69975/whm/economic-warfare-with-japan-or-a-new-treaty;
U.S.
Dep’t of State, Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 19311941, United States Government
Printing Office (1943), Relations With Japan 19381940, 9798.
54
Prime Minister Abe has suggested Japan could use mine sweepers as part of collective self defense
if mines interrupted global oil supplies interfering with Japanese citizen pursuit of happiness. Collective
NEWS
(July
14,
2014),
http://the-japandefense
right
limited:
Abe,
JAPAN
news.com/news/article/0001423669. Compare Koichi Kido defense argument at the War Crimes Trial in
Edward J. Miller, Bankrupting the Enemy (2007) 242. Abe’s comment echoing Japan’s prewar actions
reflects a theory of entitlement. See FORREST E. MORGAN, COMPELLENCE AND STRATEGIC CULTURE OF
IMPERIAL JAPAN, 174 (2003).
55
Young Lawyer's Association for The Future of Freedom, supra note 13; Voices of Overseas Youth
for Civic Engagement, supra note 44.
56
Id. Proposed Article 99.3; see also, Noah Smith, Is Japan Asia’s Next Autocracy?, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-20/japan-s-constitutional-changeis-move-toward-autocracy.
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short, rights must be respected by deliberating the effect of Cabinet action on
the citizens’ rights, but that respect does not prevent “violation” of rights if
deems such infringements as “necessary” or “reasonable.”57
To restrict abuse of the emergency clause under the Meiji
Constitution, Ito Hirobumi when drafting the Meiji Constitution58 cabined
use of the emergency clause to situations where the Diet was not in session
and subjected emergency actions taken to Diet review once the Diet returned
into session.59 Under a constitution which placed power in an Emperor
descended from the Sun Goddess, which did not provide for representative
democracy,60 did not grant self-executing rights to the public, and made no
provision for recalling the Diet into session to deal with an emergency, this
may have made sense. It is hardly a satisfactory solution for a democracy
under a constitution that separates and cabins government power.61 Postemergency review by the legislature (provided in the Meiji Constitution)
hardly compensates for the loss of human rights and freedoms the LDP’s
contemplated amendment would make permissible during that emergency
period.
Actions taken under emergency cabinet orders would be
constitutional, so neither the government nor government officials would be
responsible for actions taken in derogation of people’s rights. The 100-day
period when an emergency declaration is in place before it requires
extension by the Diet (or perhaps reordering by the Prime Minister) is a long
period; much can happen to topple a democracy, destroy an opposition

57
Abe Tells Upper House Committee ‘Emergency Provision’ Important in Constitutional Reform,
MAINICHI (Nov. 11, 2015), http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20151111/p2a/00m/0na/025000c; see also
Conservative Group Behind Pro-Constitutional Amendment Petition Collecting, MAINICHI (May, 4, 2016),
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160504/p2a/00m/0na/011000c (noting that the support group for
emergency clause amendment believes the clause will enable the setting aside of fundamental human
rights).
58
For a discussion of Ito’s views on the subject, see Colegrove, supra note 27, at 642, 657659.
59
ITO, supra note 7, at 1619.
60
KERBO MCKINSTRY, WHO RULES JAPAN: THE INNER CIRCLES OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
POWER 85 (1995). The only representative body under the Meiji Constitution was the elected Lower House
of the Diet, but at the time of adoption only some one point five percent of Japan’s forty million citizens
had the right to vote. In the run up to the Constitution, the Peace Preservation Law of 1887, which was
even more restrictive of freedoms than the Press and Newspaper Laws adopted prior to the constitution and
which had been instrumental in defeating the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, was enacted. In
1925 a draconian iteration of the Peace Preservation Law was enacted as a counterweight to the Universal
Male Suffrage Law of 1925, suppressing the rise of representative democracy.
61
This is not to suggest that some expansion of executive powers could not take place during an
emergency and/or that the judiciary might grant the executive greater authority to deal with the emergency.
See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003); Mark
Tushnet, Issues of Method in Analyzing the Policy Response to Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1581
(2004).
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movement, or punish enemies during such a period. One of the main factors
ending democracy in Rome was when the “Dictator,” acting under the
emergency provisions of governance (which limited his term of office),
remained in office. More recently, Hitler rode to power on the back of the
Weimar Republic’s Emergency Clause.62
Democracies rarely introduce emergency provisions into democratic
constitutions by way of amendment63 and a majority of “emergency
constitutions” require some actor in addition to a Head of State or Prime
Minister to approve the declaration.64 The contemplated amendment calls
for Diet (or at least House of Representatives) concurrence either before or
after a declaration, allowing a declaration to be called without prior Diet
approval and without setting at least a short time period for Diet action to
accept or reject the declaration. The amendment the LDP is considering
fails to take into account the potential for legislative or executive abuse.65
Giving the Diet authority to extend an emergency runs the risk that a
political party might remain in power by simply extending so-called
emergencies, thereby avoiding elections. This is especially true in the
Japanese situation where the Diet, like the Cabinet, is likely under the
control of the declaring Prime Minister’s party, so there likely is a
congruence of interest between the declaring Prime Minister and the Diet.
The judiciary is intentionally excluded from review of the declaration or
actions taken under emergency Cabinet orders.
Of course, democracies are not immune from the impulse to take
“emergency measures” that limit citizens’ rights in the face of an

62
Marc De Wilde, Just Trust Us: A Short History of Emergency Powers and Constitutional Change,
3 COMP. LEGAL HIST. 110 (2015). See JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND
THE RULE OF LAW 139178 (1991). See GOODMAN, supra note 17, at 2730, 492; GEORGE M.
BECKMANN, THE MAKING OF THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION 33, 7880 (1957); GEORGE AKITA, FOUNDATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN MODERN JAPAN, 18681900, at 165166 (1967); Yoshiuki Noda,
Comparative Jurisprudence in Japan: Its Past and Present, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 194, 196
(Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976); Kenzo Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese
Law, in LAW IN JAPAN 5, 34 (Arthur Taylor Von Mehren ed., 1963), would fail to recognize the possible
shortcomings of Emergency Powers in its former ally’s constitution.
63
As early as 1610 in The Case of Proclamations (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, Lord Coke held that the
British King’s proclamation right did not extend to changing either common law or statute law. See
generally Bjørnskov & Voigt, supra note 50 (citing only two examples of democratic countries who
adopted emergency provisions by amendment in footnote 3).
64
See generally Bjørnskov & Voigt, supra note 50 (stating that 58% require action by either one or
more Houses of the Legislature).
65
See generally Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 631 (2006); De Wilde, supra note 62.
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emergency.66 Ironically, Japan’s leaders, who roundly and correctly criticize
the internment of Japanese Americans during the emergency of the Pacific
War, appear poised to engrain emergency powers limiting rights and limiting
separation of power. The Supreme Court of the United States, however,
recognized its failure a mere decade later when it reined in the assertion of
Presidential power to seize steel mills to forestall a labor shutdown in order
to continue manufacture of steel needed for armaments to continue the
Korean War.67 In face of the so-called “war on terrorism,” the Court has
continued to assert its role to review actions of the executive.68
The need for such an emergency amendment is yet to be shown. The
Self Defense Force is frequently used under the current Constitution to assist
the civilian population when typhoons, tsunami, earthquakes and other
disasters occur in Japan. Japan’s government, operating under the 1947
Constitution issued much needed evacuation orders as well as instructions
when the TEPCO nuclear power plant was disabled during the 2011 Great
East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and the Fukushima Nuclear accident.
Prime Minister Kan, acting under the Constitution, went to Fukushima to
take a hands-on approach to the nuclear disaster. 69
If the emergency power amendment was adopted, the current
generation of LDP leaders would (in disregard of both their parents’ and
grandparents’ arguments that the Meiji Constitution had been abused by the
military) provide a means to set aside the 1947 Constitution’s democratizing

66
See generally Vermeule, supra note 65 (citing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE:
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998); CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673, 2679 (2005); Christina E. Wells & Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Foreword to Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Fear and Risk Perception in Times of Democratic Crisis, 69
MO. L. REV. 897 (2004); John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
427 (2003)).
67
See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
68
See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD 6588 (2015). It was not until 2011 that the
Executive Branch acknowledged that documents such as the Ringle Report on Japanese Internment,
HISTORY
AND
HERITAGE
COMMAND
(Dec.
30,
1941),
NAVAL
http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/r/ringle-reporton-japanese-internment.html, had not been made available to the Supreme Court when it was deciding the
internment cases. David G. Savage, U.S. Official Cites Misconduct in Japanese American Internment
Cases, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/24/nation/la-na-japaneseamericans-20110525.
69
See, e.g., RICHARD J. SAMUELS, 3.11: DISASTER AND CHANGE IN JAPAN 916 (2013). Yet he was
criticized for such action – not on constitutional grounds but on grounds that he was “an amateur” and
should leave handling of the disaster to the professional bureaucrats. Yuka Hayashi & Norihiko Shirouzu,
S T.
J.
(Apr.
9,
2011),
Kan
Cuts
Out
Bureaucrats,
WALL
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487045870045762 44321680679708.
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provisions such as elections, separation of powers, judicial review and
citizens’ rights, thereby creating a constitutional path enabling a potential
future generation of leaders with an autocratic bent to set aside the
democratic ideals and the rights provisions of the Constitution. For
example, the emergency Article of the Meiji Constitution was abused in
1928 when an emergency declaration was a subterfuge for the government’s
inability to obtain Diet approval of an amendment to the Peace Preservation
Laws that increased the penalties for “dangerous thoughts”.70 If adopted, a
Prime Minister’s declared emergency might, for example, be used to
criminalize speech opposing policies of the Prime Minister’s government or
speech urging the Prime Minister to step down and allow for a new Lower
House election.
While closely cabined emergency executive powers to preserve
democracy may make sense for countries with a historically strong rule of
law/rights-based systems with democracy-protecting structures, Japan does
not fall into such category. Its overly deferential judiciary (which lacks
support from the Diet and Cabinet)71 is a weak reed on which to rely.72
Japan’s executive has become the supreme organ of the State,
notwithstanding the Constitution.73 Its bureaucracy acts in extra-legal
fashion with little judicial review and shows disdain for the rule of law; in
the debate over “reinterpreting” Article 9 the powerful Cabinet Legislation
Bureau (the bureaucratic organ designed to protect the Constitution from
executive and legislative action inconsistent with the Constitution) took a

See COLEGROVE, supra note 27, at 658659 to the effect that the events of 1928 disclosed that
prewar Japan was not a democracy.
71
The Court has only found a handful of laws unconstitutional and except for their voting rights
decisions, none upholding a democratic state against Executive and Diet challenge. Even in voting rights
the Court is yet to set aside a single election for a single Diet seat. Prime Minister Abe is reported to have
considered rejecting a proposal for redistricting that would comply with the Court’s decisions and instead
would put the proposal into effect only after 2020 – thereby excluding elections in which the LDP hopes to
achieve their two-thirds majority in the Upper House enabling it to propose Constitutional amendment. See
Abe may OK electoral system reform to reduce vote-value disparity after 2020 Census, MAINICHI (Feb. 27,
2016), http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160227/p2a/ 00m/0na/013000c.
72
The 2014 Lower House election that gave the LDP its two-thirds majority in that House was held
under a condition of inequality – but no judicial relief was granted. See Top Court Questions
(Nov.
26,
2015),
Constitutionality
of
2014
Election,
MAINICHI
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20151125p2g00m0dm 056 000c.html.
73
Virtually all laws adopted by the Diet are Cabinet offered Bills written by the Executive Branch.
Gerald L. Curtis, The Government of Modern Japan: The Japanese Diet (Parliament), ASIAN TOPICS,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/at/jp_diet/govtjd03.html. The Judiciary itself acts to defeat separation of
powers doctrine by appointing Judges to serve in Executive Agencies. Kazuko Tanaka, Country Paper for
Japan, Organization and Management of Government Legal Services of Japan, ASIAN DEV. BANK,
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/71939/33069/ledge/far.pdf.
70
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“no position” position.74 Emergency powers in the Japanese situation are
both unnecessary and dangerous.75
B.

Amending the Preamble, Enhancing the Position of the Emperor,
Making the Family the Basic Unit of Society – Steps on the Road to
Pre-War Kokutai

i.

The contemplated Amendment to the Preamble and “Japanese
Uniqueness”

The LDP’s considered amendments for a new Preamble to the
Constitution would emphasize Japan’s “uniqueness,”76 a concept tied to the
notion of Kokutai and the descent of the gods in Japan,77 and whose
uniqueness is itself “special.” In Japanese myth, the gods descended on the
islands of Japan, where Jimmu, a direct descendant of the Sun Goddess
Amaterasu, moved from god to human as the first in an unbroken imperial
line leading to the current Emperor.78 Under State Shinto, the Emperor was
a living Kami; under the Japanese family system, he was the head of the
Japanese house consisting of all Japanese people who, through their descent


74
See, e.g., Cabinet Legislation Bureau has No Record of Constitution Reinterpretation
Deliberations, MAINICHI (Sep. 28, 2015), http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150928p2a
00m0na035000c.html; Cabinet Legislation Bureau Head Left No Record of Meeting About Constitutional
(Feb.
15,
2016),
Reinterpretation,
MAINICHI
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160215/p2a/00m/0na/007000c.
75
See Mark Fenwick, Emergency Powers and the Limits of Constitutionalism in Japan, in
EMERGENCY POWERS IN ASIA: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 314, 314341 (Victor V. Ramraj &
Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2010). For lack of necessity see, e.g., Most Municipalities Hit by 2011
Disasters See No Need for Emergency Clause in Constitution, MAINICHI (Apr. 30, 2016),
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160430/p2a/00m/0na /003000c.
76
Young Lawyer's Association for the Future of Freedom, supra note 13; Voices of Overseas Youth
for Civic Engagement, supra note 44; see generally CHRISTIAN G. WINKLER, THE QUEST FOR JAPAN’S NEW
CONSTITUTION: AN ANALYSIS OF VISIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROPOSALS 19802009 (2011).
See also REPETA, supra note 44.
77
NOZOMU KAWAMURA, SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIETY OF JAPAN 154 (Routledge 2011); HANE &
PEREZ, supra note 3, at 2425.
78
MOTOORI NORINAGA, The True Tradition of the Sun Goddess, 2 SOURCES OF JAPANESE
TRADITION 15–22 (Ryusaku Tsunoda et al. eds., 1964); ROBERT J. SMITH, ANCESTOR WORSHIP IN
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 811 (1974); HANE & PEREZ, supra note 3, at 2425; JOHN S. BROWNLEE,
JAPANESE HISTORIANS AND THE NATIONAL MYTHS, 16001945: THE AGE OF THE GODS AND EMPEROR
JIMMU 47 (1997). A modern illustration of the dangers of an Emergency Clause, even in the face of an
attempted Military Coup, is seen by the over reaction to the attempted coup in Turkey during the summer
of 2016. See Ozan Varol, Turkey’s Reichstag Fire, WORLD POST, (July 22, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/turkeys-reichstag-fire_us_5791f215e4b0a1917a 6e71e3.
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from lesser Kami had a mythical relationship to each other79 and to the
Emperor, who was entitled to unquestioned obedience.80 Under pre-war
Kokutai, Japan was one national family under the Emperor.81
Differences between societies make each unique in the sense that they
are different from each other. Japan’s pre-war era uniqueness was of a
special character;82 a code word whose meaning was superiority of the
“Yamato race.”83 Ideas of Japanese superiority can be traced to early Japan

79
The various clans making up the Japanese people were also considered descendants of Kami and
related to the Sun Goddess (who was the Kami ancestor of the Imperial family). See Hugh H. Smythe, The
Japanese Emperor System, 19 SOCIAL RESEARCH 485, 492 (1952). See BRIJ TANKHA, KITA IKKI AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 17, 28 (Global Oriental 2006) (the tying of the prevailing prewar idea of
Japanese uniqueness and kokutai to the “sacred” origin or “divinity” of Japan.)
80
See, e.g., statement by Emperor Hirohito upon enthronement quoted in QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at
7475.
81
SMITH, supra note 78, at 2526; HAROLD J. WRAY, Changes and Continuity in Japanese Images
of the Kokutai and Attitudes and Roles Toward the Outside World, A Content Analysis of Japanese
Textbooks 1903-1945, at 1819, 316, 408, 411 (1971); Cecil Brett, The Priest-Emperor Concept in
Japanese Political Thought, 23 INDIAN J. OF POL. SCIENCE 17, 2526 (1962); Mariko Asano Tamanoi,
Japanese Nationalism and the Female Body: A Critical Reassessment of the Discourse of Social Reformers
on Factory Women, in WOMEN AND CLASS IN JAPANESE HISTORY 275, 280 (Hitomi Tonomura et al. eds.,
1999).
82
The Occupation’s Shinto Directive attacked this idea of uniqueness by forbidding the teaching of
Japan’s alleged imperial, national or territorial superiority based on ancestry or divine descent. SUPREME
COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, The Shinto Directive, (15 December 1945); see also JOSEPH M.
KITAGAWA, RELIGION IN JAPANESE HISTORY 271 (1966).
83
Race fueled the Pacific War. American discrimination against Asians had its origin in the
Immigration Act of 1790 which limited nationalization to “white” people, see Ozawa v. United States, 260
U.S. 178 (1922) and United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), and culminated in the Japanese exclusion
from the Pacific Coast and internment during the war. In 1889, the Supreme Court in Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, laying the foundation for
later rulings that upheld Alien Land Laws that effectively prohibited Japanese from acquiring land in
Pacific Coast states. See Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197
(1923). The California Alien Land law was only held unconstitutional after the War had ended. See Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). For American prewar discrimination against Asians, see generally
COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 2746,
317322 (1982); Office of the Historian, Japanese-American Relations at the Turn of the Century, 19001922, DEP’T OF STATE, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/japanese-relations. The exclusion of
Japanese American’s from the West Coast and their imprisonment after Pearl Harbor, notwithstanding
evidence that the West Coast Japanese were loyal to the United States, was a culminating act of such
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and especially the Tokugawa period.84 All of which raises the question
whether “unique” in the LDP contemplated amendment has a similar
racial/superior component.85 Uniqueness of Japan, its people, and its culture
was a central feature of pre-war Kokutai under which sovereignty was in the
Emperor who, as a descendant of the Sun Goddess,86 was both the Head of
State Shinto and Head of State, with authority and power inherent to all
heads of State.87
One of the “unique” aspects of Kokutai was a rejection of
individuality and reliance on Japan’s group-oriented society whose basic
unit was not the individual, but the family group, the iye,88 itself a bulwark


racial backlash in a Japan that considered itself a superior culture and society, making accommodation to
American demands impossible. See generally JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER
IN THE PACIFIC WAR (1986).
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at 1819, 408411.
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of the Kokutai.89 The communal nature of Japanese society as one family
under the Emperor was central to Kokutai.90
The contemplated Preamble’s emphasis on uniqueness is related to the
amendment that would make the Emperor the Head of State and other
seemingly unrelated amendments such as the amendment to strike
individuality from the Constitution and the amendment to make the family
the basic unit of society. Rejection of individuality (a trait which is seen as
an unwelcome Western import) and reliance on the family group were
unique aspects of Kokutai.91 Under Kokutai, Japanese sovereignty resided
in the Emperor, not in the people.92 The Constitution’s rejection of the prewar Kokutai is reflected in the Preamble that states, “sovereign power
resides with the people.”93 In addition to stressing Japan’s “uniqueness,” the
new Preamble would delete this phrase and simply refer to “popular
sovereignty.”
History enables us to gain a better understanding of what the
amendment would mean. In the period of so-called Taisho Democracy,
Japan refused to accede to the Kellogg Briand Pact (under which acceding
nations renounced war) on behalf of the Japanese people, because to do so
would denigrate the Emperor.94 Japan also sought to add as a condition to
the unconditional surrender demanded by the Allies, that the prerogatives of
the Emperor were not to be affected by surrender.95 The Allies declined but
noted that the ultimate “form” of government was to be determined by the
Japanese people. To some in Japan’s government, this provided breathing
room for Kokutai arguing that “form” of government dealt with

89
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administration and could be decided by the people while Kokutai was of a
different nature and remained unaffected.96 The issue surfaced again when
Japanese negotiators and translators responded to the Occupation’s draft
Constitution by attempting to change the basis of the imperial position from
“sovereign will of the people” to “supreme will”,97 all seeking to protect the
Kokutai nature of the Emperor as the vessel of Japanese sovereignty.
The Preamble under contemplation would reject the Constitution’s
recognition of sovereignty of the people as the source of legitimate
government and thus reject the ideal that government is responsible to the
people. Together with the amendments to make the family the basic unit of
Japanese society, to remove individuality from the Constitution, and to make
the Emperor the Head of State, the LDP could be well on the way to
recreating the pre-war Kokutai.
ii.

Enhancing the position of the Emperor

Under Kokutai, the Emperor was the head of the Japanese house98
owed the respect and obedience from his subjects (members of the house)
that the family head of house was owed by all family members.99 Schools
taught State Shinto. The Emperor’s Rescript on Education was seen as
virtually sacred with its “morals” and “ethics” more powerful than religious
writ.100 Reverence to the Emperor, the cult of Emperor worship and family
fealty owed to the Emperor as the head of house was learned at an early
age.101 Kimigayo (idealizing the Emperor’s reign and rule) became the
national anthem in 1888.102 The State became an extension of the Emperor
through the concept of Kokutai, which tied the Japanese people to the State

96
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and their very special relationship to the Emperor, to each other, to
Amaterasu, and the gods.103
The 1947 Constitution does not give the Emperor any governmental
position—he is simply the Emperor. He was intentionally not given the
Head of State title104 and was to be a symbol without power,105 which is
underscored by the current Article 3 that limits the Emperor to performing
acts of state that have been subjected to the advice of and approval by the
Cabinet.106 The LDP contemplates removal of the current Article 3 and
unhinging imperial acts from Cabinet superiority (approval). The 1947
Constitution gives the Emperor specific functions to perform, all are
ceremonial, carrying out government decisions in which the Emperor has
played no role. The LDP would make the Emperor the Head of State
without providing what authority the Head of State would possess except for
the fact that imperial acts need not be limited by advice and concurrence of
the Cabinet.107
The position of Head of State implicates the historic, cultural, and
Kokutai role of the Emperor, especially as the change to the Preamble would
bring to the fore the “uniqueness” of Japan that was central to Kokutai and
the Emperor’s ancestry. In its initial response indicating willingness to
accept the Potsdam Declaration, Japan added one condition, retention of the
Emperor's prerogatives.108 This might have meant the retention of the
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Emperor as Head of State, and his Kokutai character, the contemplated
amendment may be a means of returning to the initial Japanese response.
The amendment would enable conservatives to argue that because the
Emperor is Head of State as he was in Meiji Japan, together with the
“uniqueness” of Japan that was the essence of the Kokutai (this uniqueness
would now be recognized in the amended Preamble), and the dropping of
Preamble language placing sovereignty in the people of Japan, the Emperor
has the Kokutai status he held in the pre-war era. This argument would be
strengthened by the considered amendment to Article 99 that would exempt
the Emperor (Head of State) from the obligation to support the
Constitution.109
The position of Head of State implies governmental powers typically
exercised by a Head of State and implies the authority to create subordinate
organs to assist the Head of State. The Emperor’s current ability to perform
specific duties derives not from his title but from the fact that the
Constitution gives the Emperor the authority to perform specific and limited
ceremonial duties. He appoints the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
because the Constitution says he shall do so, not because he is Head of State.
The reason for such appointment authority is to elevate the position of the
Chief Justice and highlight the rule of law, not to enhance the Emperor.
Granting the Emperor the Head of State mantle would give him a
government position allowing government ministers to seek his view on
matters, as well as give him the authority that inheres in the position of Head
of State, an authority that is subject to interpretation. In some countries
where there is both a Prime Minister and a Head of State, the Head of State
may have broad powers, including the ability to determine when a new
election must be held after a government is discharged.110 To those who
would argue that the Constitution would still restrain the Emperor’s powers,
one need look no further than the dual character of the Emperor under the
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Meiji Constitution,111 it could be argued that a dual character would exist,
under which his powers as Emperor would be limited by Chapter I while his
powers as Head of State would not be so limited.112 Head of State, Emperor
Hirohito, may not have exercised power, but he had great authority; without
his agreement the war could not have been prosecuted. When he told a
divided Cabinet to accept the Potsdam Declaration, he ended the war.113 As
is true generally, but more so in regard to Japanese law, it is the law as
interpreted rather than the written law that is controlling.114
The change would be substantive: it would provide a juridical hook on
which to hang a “Cabinet Declaration” overturning 70 years of interpretation
of Chapter I of the Constitution115 or allow the Cabinet Legislation Bureau to
take “no position” on the interpretation issue ala its actions involving the
Cabinet Declaration concerning Article 9.116 Once given a government
position not cabined by the Constitution, the perennial LDP majority could
provide the Emperor significant powers by legislation giving such powers to
the Head of State. In short, the amendment could lead to replacement of the
symbolic Emperor with a Kokutai status Emperor.
The Constitution would make this replacement relatively easy because
the Constitution does not use the English language title Emperor, but rather
uses the Japanese term “Tenno,” which has a “heavenly” characteristic.117 A
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“heavenly Emperor” Head of State uniquely descended from the Sun
Goddess and Jimmu would represent something akin to Emperors under the
Meiji Constitution.118 The contemplated amendment to Article 20 that
would remove the prohibition of any religious organization exercising
political authority while permitting the State or organs of the State (for
example an Emperor Head of State) to engage in religious activities that are
traditional or considered matters of social etiquette119 would enhance the
status of and powers of a Tenno “heavenly Emperor” Head of State
performing services that are the interface between the Emperor descended
from the gods and the gods themselves, and would support a return to the
pre-war Kokutai.120
While Emperor Hirohito in his “humanity declaration” rejected the
idea that he was a god, he did not reject his lineage tracing back to the Sun
Goddess, nor his inheritance of sovereignty over the land and people of
Japan from his imperial ancestors ranging back to the Sun Goddess, the
foundations of his pre-war Kokutai status.121 In Shinto there is no single god
in the monotheistic sense of the word, although god-like characters such as
the Sun Goddess are part of Shinto. Shinto Kami, while they partake of
deification, are not God in the Old or New Testament or Koran exclusiveGod sense.122 Kami are both gods who rule the earth, sky, and underworld,
but are also spirits that can adhere in everything in the natural world, in
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ancestors, in people, in beautiful scenery.123 The Sun Goddess is the
principle heavenly Kami of the Japanese myth and ancestor to, but only to,
the imperial family.124 While not a God in the “monotheistic” sense,
Hirohito’s supposed ancestry going back to the Sun Goddess gave him a
different status from other beings and in this sense reflected his divinity.125
Although some Japanese people thought of him as a god in the “one God”
traditions, others rejected that view.126 It was only his supposed status as a
“one God”-type god that Hirohito renounced.127
The Emperor did not acknowledge that the idea of a living Emperor
god was a relatively new phenomenon which the Meiji revolutionaries
adopted, building on theocratic ideas of the late Tokugawa period to
strengthen their hold on power,128 or that the myth of descent from the Sun
Goddess was created to support the ancient Yamato rulers' hold on power.129
Refusal to renounce his descent from the Sun Goddess was not accidental
nor was his failure to acknowledge that such descent was a myth, creating
ambiguity allowing some conservatives, nationalists and revisionists to
worship his descendant to this day.130 Nor did the Emperor renounce the
idea that the Japanese people themselves were progeny of the Kami, an idea
inherent in State Shinto’s placement of the Emperor as head of the Japanese
family, carried forward by the Rescript on Education and the curriculum in
Meiji Constitution-era schools,131 and at the heart of the idea that the
Japanese are descendants of the gods132 whose imperial line reached back
into prehistory making them unique and superior.133
Shinto and the Emperor’s unbroken lineage back to the Sun Goddess
continue to play a role in modern Japan, including a role in the ascension of
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a new Emperor, making it easy to transition from a symbolic Emperor to a
heavenly Emperor with implied powers inherent in a Head of State
unshackled from consent of the Cabinet for his acts and who has no
constitutional obligation to respect the Constitution. Article 24 of the
Imperial Household Law (the law that governs accession, succession, and
various aspects of the imperial family’s life) requires a new Emperor to go
through an accession ceremony, the precise nature of which is undefined.
The Shinto ceremony known as Daijosai is part of the enthronement.
Various explanations of the function and what occurs during this ceremony
have been put forward. The Imperial Household Agency explains on its
website only that it involves the offering of new rice to the acceding
Emperor’s ancestors.134
Mystery surrounds the fundamental question of whether by
performing this ceremony—which takes place in part in the dead of night
within a temple—the Emperor, notwithstanding Emperor Hirohito’s
renunciation of any claim to being a living god, becomes a Kami spirit or
god.135 That mystery and the incomplete nature of the Emperor’s declaration
have left room for those who wish to return the Emperor to his pre-war
status to argue that nothing has changed.136 The Daijosai, full of mystery,137
was tied to the Kami-like status of the Emperor in the Meiji Constitution and
earlier eras.138 It is tied to the Emperor’s claimed lineage back to the dawn
of Japan, to the Sun Goddess, to the numerous Emperors before him.139
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direct lineage to the Sun Goddess was generally accepted by Japanese society from as early as the Yamato
Kingdom of the 7th or 8th Century through the Pacific War and still holds sway in some segments of the
population—it was the linchpin for the Emperor’s special status and vessel of Japanese sovereignty).
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Theories are that it transforms the Emperor into a living Kami,140 that he is
responsible for the Japanese people, even that he gathers into himself the
spirit of previous Emperors going back to Jimmu.141 Theories abound and
can be created to fit one’s belief or agenda.
While the Supreme Court allowed the expenditure of government
funds for the Daijosai when Emperor Akihito was enthroned, it did so on the
fiction that the ceremony was secular and was required to complete the
formalities of accession.142
Adoption of the amendment allowing
government involvement in traditional ceremonies would permit recognition
of Daijosai as a Shinto ceremony because it is traditional, and thereby opens
the door to recognizing the religious significance of the ceremony—a door
currently closed because of the Constitution.143 Once opened, the path
towards recognition of the Emperor as a living Kami would be made
respectable and constitutional, supporting the Emperor’s pre-war Kokutai
status.
The history of Japan is filled with situations in which the Emperor
was used by a faction to overturn or attempt to overturn a government – the
Meiji Restoration being the most recent. If the Tenno were to become the
Head of State with the ability to perform traditional religious functions, it
could dramatically change the relationship of the people and government to
the Emperor.144 A Tenno Head of State performing Shinto ceremonies in
Shinto shrines as an intermediary between the people and their ancestors
provides a handy tool for mischief.145 It should not be forgotten that the

140
Katsutoshi Takami, From Devine Legitimacy to the Myth of Consensus, The Emperor System and
Popular Sovereignty, in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 9, 10–11 (Yoichi
Higuchi ed., 2001).
141
STUART D. B. PICKEN, ESSENTIALS OF SHINTO: AN ANALYTICAL GUIDE TO PRINCIPAL TEACHINGS
82–87 (Charles Wei-hsun Fu ed., 1994).
142
QUIGLEY, supra note 8, at 62, 78 (describing how Emperor Akihito’s accession ceremony
spawned legal challenges because government money was unconstitutionally used for a religious
ceremony. Courts concluded the ceremony was essentially secular and required to install the new Emperor.
The Cabinet declared it secular— reminiscent of the pre-war government’s declaration that Shinto was not
a religion and Shinto shrines not religious; SHILLONY, supra note 120, at 258 (describing how the accession
ceremony justified use of government money because it was a private ceremony of the imperial family to
uphold the status). See Takamori Akinori, Daigosai, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SHINTO, (Jan. 29, 2007),
http://eos.kokugakuin.ac.jp/modules/xwords/entry.php?entryID=883 (explaining how daijosai is, of course,
recognized as an ancient Shinto ceremony); see also Steven R. Weisman, Akihito Performs His Solitary
Rite, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/23/world/akihito-performs-hissolitary-rite.html.
143
JERROLD M. PACKARD, SONS OF HEAVEN: A PORTRAIT OF THE JAPANESE MONARCHY 18–21
(1987).
144
Brett, supra note 81, at 25–28.
145
See Kades, supra note 33, at 215, 234 (discussing importance of making the Emperor’s role
unambiguous).
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Meiji oligarchs enhanced the status of and Kami-like nature of the Meiji
Emperor (enshrined in Tokyo’s Meiji Shrine) and then used the young
Emperor Meiji to carry out their authoritarian government policies. A future
Japanese leader (perhaps yet unborn) with authoritarian tendencies could
similarly use a heavenly Emperor Head of State with authority to perform
Shinto religious ceremonies because they are part of etiquette or are
considered traditional to displace Japan’s fragile democracy with an
authoritarian regime.
iii.

Removing Individuality and the Guarantee of Fundamental Human
Rights from the Constitution’s Text

Article 13 of the Constitution requires that all of the people (kokumin,
i.e., Japanese people) be treated as individuals and that legislation focus on
their rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness moderated by public
welfare considerations. However, reminiscent of the Meiji State’s emphasis
on group compliance and public order, select amendments proposed by the
LDP intend to strike treating people as individuals to treat them instead as a
“people.”146 In addition, the LDP proposes a new heading and additional
text for Article 12, emphasizing the public’s responsibility not to abuse
constitutional rights, and to recognize that freedom and rights are balanced
by duties and obligations.147 The LDP also suggests removing Article 97

146
See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, 1970 (A) no. 1310, SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ
[SAIBANSHO WEB], http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=38 (Japan) (explaining the
significance of the Constitutional recognition of individuality was commented on by Justice Tanaka in his
concurring opinion wherein the Court struck down enhanced punishment for patricide: “The clause that
‘every person of this country should be respected as an individual’ . . . declares a fundamental idea of
regarding the respect of individual dignity as an origin of all the values, and that the guarantee of the
equality of every individual is the fundamental principle and the basis of democracy … every unreasonable
discrimination ascertained in the light of the fundamental principle of democracy to respect and to
guarantee individual dignity and individual values, should be considered invalid as violating of the spirit of
this provision.” His view has not been applied by the Court in later decisions.
147
Young Lawyer’s Association for the Future of Freedom, supra note 13. See also Voices of
Overseas Youth for Civic Engagement, supra note 44; Kyodo News, Komeito may opt against right to
TIMES
(Mar.
23,
2015),
good
environment
amendment
in
Constitution,
JAPAN
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/23/national/politics-diplomacy/komeito-may-opt-against-rightto-good-environment-amendment-inconstitution/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=komeito-may-opt-against-right-to-goodenvironment-amendment-in-constitution#.VUa-tLl0zIV (describing how lawmakers are considering new
Constitutional obligations on the part of the State to protect the environment which are likely to be
dropped); European Commission Press Release IP/14/324, The Commission, Environment: Commission
takes Greece to court over failure to protect iconic species (Mar. 28, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-14-324_en.htm (stating that the European Commission in suing a European State to compel it to
meet its obligation to protect the environment); David R. Boyd, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy
MAGAZINE
(July-August
2012)
Environment,
ENVIRONMENT
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(which currently recognizes that fundamental human rights are “fruits of the
age-old struggle of man to be free”). This would be an effort to emphasize
public order over the rights of the people, and to acknowledge that the rights
granted by the Emperor to his subjects in the Meiji Constitution were a gift
from the Emperor, and that the grant of rights in the LDP-amended
Constitution is also a grant from the Emperor, not fundamental rights
applicable to all humanity.148 While the LDP’s considered amendments
would acknowledge that “respect” be given to fundamental human rights
elsewhere in the Constitution, respect for rights is not equivalent to a
guarantee of the rights in the Constitution; a right may be respected but
nonetheless restricted or violated by legislation.149
The idea that each person, each individual, has fundamental human
rights was a basic idea of the Enlightenment period that informed the writers
of the Constitution of the United States, but was rejected by Ito Hirobumi
when drafting the Meiji Constitution. The Meiji oligarchs, pre-war Japanese
leaders, and schools rejected individualism,150 and used the Rescript on
Education, The Way of the Subject, as well as the Peace Preservation Law to
stifle individualistic thought.151 The Ministry of Education’s definitive
explanation of Kokutai noted that the Japanese were unique and superior
partly because they rejected individualism.152 Notwithstanding the 1947
Constitution’s emphasis on individual rights, Japanese schools continue their

http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/2012/July-August%202012/constitutionalrights-full.html; The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Draft for the Amendment of the Constitution of
Japan: in contrast to the current Constitution (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.voyce-jpn.com/ldp-draftconstitution (proposing consideration be given to the rights of crime victims (likely permitting crime
victim's rights to balance and diminish rights of the accused and the presumption of innocence) and to
protect citizens abroad (opening the door to demands that the SDF be used to free Japanese hostages or
other Japanese citizens who either the government, or a particularly strong interest group, might conclude
are wrongfully held in a foreign State. Government inaction might be seen as violating their Constitutional
duty leading to the same type of “sincere belief” excuse for actions—including assassinations—that
brought down civil government in the lead up to the Pacific War).
148
Jones, supra note 44.
149
It can be argued that rights were “respected” by the Meiji Constitution through the Constitution’s
reference to them. Nonetheless the right was subject to legislation.
150
BROWN, supra note 90, at 104105.
151
See Sharon H. Nolte, National Morality and Universal Ethics, Onishi Hajime and the Imperial
Rescript on Education, 38 MONUMENTA NIPPONICA 283 (1983); BROWN, supra note 90, at 222225;
Mitchell, supra note 26, at 317, 319, 322, 323, 343; ROSS, supra note 86, at 143. The denigration of
individualism may be traced to the Tokugawa status system as the “group” one belonged to was the class
one was assigned upon birth. HANE & PEREZ, supra note 3, at 21. See TSUNODA ET AL., supra note 29, at
139140, for the text of the Rescript on Education.
152
DOWER, supra note 85, at 221223; WRAY, supra note 81, at 408410.
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pre-war role of teaching children how to conform as part of their group153
and modern Japan remains dominated by a “consensus” or group model.154
Japan’s modern leaders share their predecessor’s rejection of
individuality.155 Individualism is deemed inconsistent with the “uniqueness”
that adheres to the Japanese as a group and compels individuals to
subordinate their individuality to the unique Japanese group, culture, values
and thought process.156 This group emphasis is moderated in the public
sphere by the Constitution’s grant of individual rights that allows individuals
to swim against the group tide and, for example, speak out in opposition to
the prevailing majority opinion or sue the State (or their employer or third
parties) for violating the individual’s rights. But, there is a contradiction of

153

Robert Aspinall, Violence in Schools: Tensions Between the “Individual” and the “Group” in the
Japanese Educational System, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 235, 236240 (Jeff Kingston
ed., 2014). Although the Occupation failed in its attempt to make individuality a core value in Japan (See
MASUDA, supra note 36, at 217218) there is evidence that some educators at the university level recognize
that the effort to downplay individuality is part of an objective to turn a rights based constitution into a
public order based constitution. See, e.g., Takuya Asakura, University chancellor: Embrace individualism,
SHIMBUN
(May
1,
2015),
be
wary
of
constitutional
revision,
in
ASAHI
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201505010008.
154
See, e.g., Anne Imamura, Family Culture, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MODERN JAPANESE
CULTURE 76 et seq. (Yoshio Sugimoto ed., 2009); INOUE, supra note 8, at 231235; PATRICK SMITH,
JAPAN: A REINTERPRETATION 11220 (1997). Many times “rights” are seen from a group rather than
individual perspective. Carl F. Goodman, The Evolving Law of Document Production in Japanese Civil
Procedure: Context, Culture, and Community, 33 BROOK. J. OF INT’L LAW 125 (2007); EDWIN O.
REISCHAUER & MARIUS B. JANSEN, THE JAPANESE TODAY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 128 (1998); Charles
R. Fenwick, Culture, Philosophy and Crime: The Japanese Experience, 9 INT’L J. OF COMP. & APPLIED
CRIM. JUST. 67, 7172 (1985); Haim Weinberg, The Culture of the Group and Groups from Different
Cultures, 36 GROUP ANALYSIS 253, 260 (2003); YASUMASA KURODA, THE CORE OF JAPANESE
DEMOCRACY 149 (2005).
155
Japan’s judiciary has rejected individuality. In cases involving surrogate birth or in vitro
fertilization, the Supreme Court focuses not on the rights of the surrogate, egg or sperm donors, genetic
parents or the children conceived and/or born as a consequence but rather on whether society approves of
the procedure as shown by statute allowing it. See SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2006, 2004 (Ju)
1748, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHU] 7 (holding that posthumously conceived child not
registered in deceased husband’s family register, although the sperm had been harvested specifically for the
purpose of in vitro fertilization – interests of the child are subordinated to “public interest”); SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 23, 2007, 2006 (Kyo) 47, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHU] 2
(holding that children conceived with egg and sperm of married Japanese couple but carried by a surrogate
in the United States was not allowed to be registered in genetic father’s family register notwithstanding that
the surrogate claimed no rights, the genetic parents wanted registration, U.S. law allowed the process, and a
U.S. court certified that the Japanese parents were the child’s natural parents, and such registration was in
the best interests of the child). Cf. SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 10, 2013, 2013 (Kyo) 5, 67 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHU] 9 (holding that a child born to a couple, one of whom suffered
from gender identity disorder and had a sex change but could not have been the genetic father of the child,
could be added to father’s family registry because the law allowed for change of sex of the GID parent,
indicating societal approval).
156
DALE, supra note 85, at 2023.
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sorts – societal norms in Japan are group oriented while the law and
constitution’s orientation is individual focused in order to protect each
individual’s rights. The amendments would turn the Constitution’s attention
(and hence the law’s attention) away from individual rights and towards the
obligations that human beings owe to society, community, and ultimately,
the Japanese State157 consistent with The Way of the Subject (required
reading for Japanese troops)158 and the Fundamentals of Our National Polity
that spelt out the nature of the Japanese Kokutai and rejected individuality.159
Article 12 of the 1947 Constitution already specifies that freedom and
rights come with responsibility and obligations, a provision that is
substantive, and not just “window dressing.” Article 12 reads:
Article 12. The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by
this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor
of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these
freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for
utilizing them for the public welfare.160
In the Tokyo Metropolitan Public Safety case, the Supreme Court
upheld a Tokyo ordinance that required the permission of the Metropolitan
Public Safety Commission before a mass demonstration could be held in
Tokyo—whether on public ways or private property. 161 The Court therefore
recognized that freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 21 of the 1947
Constitution is “eternal and inviolate,” and is a fundamental human right
that, like all other human rights granted by the Constitution, is subject to
Article 12’s public welfare and abuse limitation. The Court concluded that
because the ordinance did not “unreasonably” abridge freedom of expression

157
VOX POPULI: The constitutional debate over 'human beings' vs. 'individuals', ASAHI SHIMBUN,
(Feb. 24, 2014) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/vox/AJ201402240045.
158
DOWER, supra note 85, at 26.
159
See Tsunoda et al., supra note 29, at 278288, for excerpts from Fundamentals of our National
Polity (Introduction).
160
KENPŌ art. 12.
161
The Ordinance reads, in part: “Article 1. A permission of the Metropolitan Public Safety
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Public Safety Commission) is required in order to hold a
meeting or mass parade on the road or other public places, or engage in mass demonstration irrespective of
places. However, cases that come under any item of the following are excepted from the provision of the
present article. 1. Picnics or educational trips of students and pupils, physical education meetings and sports
meetings. 2. Established functions such as the ceremonies of coming of age, marriage, funeral, and
ancestral worship.” SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO [Sup.Ct.] July 20, 1960, 1960 (A) 112, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
HANERISHŪ [SAIBANSHO WEB] http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=15 (quoting ordinance).

JANUARY 2017

Contemplated Amendments to Japan’s 1947 Constitution

49

or exceed what was required for public welfare, it was constitutional.162
Because Article 12 already permits “reasonable” limitations on fundamental
human rights, it is proper to ask: “what does the amendment to Article 12
emphasizing the public’s responsibility not to abuse their rights and to
recognize that freedom and rights are balanced by duties and obligations
seek to achieve?” Clearly it is to emphasize and make clear that actions that
disturb the public interest and public order constitute an abuse of and thus
are outside the ambit and protection of constitutional rights, thereby
reinforcing Article 12’s restriction on fundamental human rights so that in a
clash between the obligation not to abuse constitutional rights and an
individual’s constitutional right, the public order and public interest should
prevail.
The Supreme Court of Japan has applied a balancing test under which
rights granted to individuals under the Constitution (in the case at issue the
rights of a criminal suspect), must be balanced against the constitutional
right of the State (the prosecutor) to perform its functions, and in the
process, has denied criminal suspects many of their constitutional rights.
The consequence has been to interpret the Criminal Procedure Code
provisions as defining the constitutional rights granted to suspects and
accused persons.163 By placing rights of the citizens on the same
constitutional plane as citizens’ obligations to the public order and public
good,164 the Constitution would now require that each right contained in the
Constitution be balanced against a public order or public good limitation,

162
Id. At times the SDF force (and other governing bodies) may question and obtain personal
information (political affiliation, employment, etc.) from demonstrators. A High Court held in early 2016
that such activities violated the privacy of demonstrators, but allowed only approximately $1,000 in
damages to a single demonstrator and refused to enjoin such activities in the future. High court upholds
(Feb.
02,
2016)
damages
payment
over
SDF
intelligence
activities,
MAINICHI
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160202/p2g/00m/0dm/052000c.
163
In a 1999 case the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court permitted the prosecutor to question a
suspect even after the suspect requested to meet with counsel. The Court recognized that the Constitution
gave the suspect the right to meet but because the right to punish those who commit crimes is presumed by
the Constitution, this State function has constitutional recognition placing it on a par with the right to
consult with counsel. Accordingly, the Diet may strike a “reasonable” balance between these two
constitutionally recognized rights. The accused right is not given priority over the State's right to punish the
guilty. The State's right (per Code of Criminal Procedure) to question a suspect outside the presence of
counsel for twenty-three days is a reasonable balance. Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] Mar. 24, 1999, 1993 (O)
SAIBANSHO
HANREISHŪ
[SAIBANSHO
WEB]
1,
1189,
SAIKŌ
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=433.
164
It can be argued that public order and public good includes “social order” which would appear to
contemplate an obligation not to disturb accepted social order. See Repeta, supra note 44.
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which either was or was not defined in a legislative pronouncement.165 The
effect of the amendments would codify the existing prioritization of societal
rights over individual rights in the criminal law arena and extend that
prioritization to other areas of the law thereby limiting constitutional rights
to legislative definitions of public interest and public order, resurrecting the
Matsumoto draft of the Constitution and the Meiji Constitution’s limitation
of rights to only such rights as are granted by the government (i.e., rights set
out in the Constitution and not taken away or modified by legislation are
granted, whereas those taken away or limited by legislation are denied as
long as the legislation is “reasonable”). Legislation would define the public
order and would define what rights the people had by defining when the
exercise of a right was inconsistent with the constitutional duty to conform
to the public good and public order. Worse yet, lack of legislation defining
the meaning of constitutional rights would leave open the question of
whether the exercise of the right conformed to the Constitution; this would
allow the executive and accommodating bureaucratic judiciary to decide if
the individual made a mistake in understanding what was or was not in the
interest of the public order, as was the case for Professor Minobe in the
1920s and 1930s.166 The desired constitutional change is reminiscent of the
1934 law that increased the penalties for acts inconsistent with the public
order, which caused a dissenting Diet member to complain that “public
order” was subject to very broad interpretation, suggesting the amendment
would be extremely dangerous.167

165
The Court has even balanced the free speech rights of citizens who object to government policy to
the “privacy” rights of citizens who do not want handouts dropped in their publicly available mailboxes the privacy right has prevailed. See GOODMAN, supra note 88, at 160161. On the other hand, high volume
broadcasts of right wing speeches from moving vehicles are permitted as free speech. Daniel Dolan,
Cultural Noise: Amplified Sound, Freedom of Expression and Privacy Rights in Japan, 2 INT’L J. COMM.
662, 664 (2008).
166
In 2007, the Court upheld a criminal conviction finding that an ordinance designed to discourage
motorcycle gangs by prohibiting them from demonstrating or congregating in public while wearing
clothing that shows the name of the motorcycle group or was “peculiar” was too broadly worded. However,
since arrests could only be made after a warning from a city official, the conviction was affirmed. The court
found that the warning was sufficient to disclose that the action was in violation of the ordinance,
regardless of the ordinance’s vague and overbroad wording. Two Justices dissented. To the majority it
seemed clear that the defendant, once warned, should have known that the ordinance applied to him. The
free speech issue was not discussed, apparently because it was clear that the ordinance was acceptable
under Article 12, and as one Justice put it, the feeling of the public had to be considered (i.e., public order
and public welfare). Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] Sep. 18, 2007, 2005 (A) 1819 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
HANREISHŪ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1, http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=911 (Horigomi, J.,
concurring).
167
See KASZA, supra note 29, at 127128.
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Contemplated Article 12 would be a rejection of what today is
virtually a universal view among true democracies; namely, a significant
purpose of a written constitution is to prevent government abuse by
guaranteeing its peoples’ rights against the government, not to place
obligations, including the obligation to conform to the government’s
definition of public interest and public order, on the public. It would
represent a new and troubling form of Japanese uniqueness.168
Instead of Article 97’s recognition of fundamental human rights,
people would be treated as “people” (or “humans”) rather than individuals.
But the LDP amendments do not define what rights adhere to being a person
or human.169 By implication they are not what are generally understood to
be “fundamental human rights,” such as those promulgated by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (which Japan has signed), because the term
“fundamental human rights” is being specifically removed from the
Constitution.170 An LDP pamphlet makes clear that Western ideas of natural
rights should be rejected.171
Removal of Article 97 may have meaning by negative implication. It
is not all people who are entitled to the rights set out in the Constitution, but
only the citizens of Japan (kokumin). Thus, the citizens of Japan are granted
the rights under the Constitution to be treated as humans, but how are noncitizens to be treated? If a constitutional provision to treat Japanese people
as humans or people is required (rather than recognition of the fundamental
nature of human rights that apply to all humans) then by negative
implication non-Japanese people, who are not granted the right to be treated
like people, lack the right granted to Japanese citizens to be treated like
people. Aside from the paternalism reflected by such language, if applied to
bears this would mean that Japanese bears shall be treated as bears – North
American black bears, Russian bears, or polar bears would, by negative
implication have no right to be treated as bears. The residents of Japan who

168
The change could also remove the Constitution’s function as supreme law, as it would only be
supreme law if the legislature did not pass a conflicting or limiting statute.
169
The phase “fundamental human rights” has real meaning. Through such documents as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights those fundamental rights are defined. See JOSEPH WRONKA,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 227 (rev. ed. 1998); Onuma Yasuake, Towards
a More Inclusive Human Rights Regime, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 110114
(Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell, eds., 1999).
170
It is reported that the intention is to rid the Japanese Constitution of Western enlightenment human
rights theories. Smith, supra note 56.
171
Lawrence Repeta, Limiting Fundamental Rights Protection in Japan: The Role of the Supreme
Court, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 49 (2013).
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are not citizens would be outside the frame of fundamental human rights and
thus would have no constitutional right to be treated by the Japanese
government as people or humans. Could they be treated as somewhat less
human than their Japanese neighbors? Would Japan be obligated to treat
people outside Japan as human?172 Could all non-Japanese wherever located
be treated as something less human than Japanese?173
Such a provision would be particularly harmful to “Special
Permanent Residents” of Japan, defined as Korean residents at the time of
surrender who were not repatriated to Korea and lost their Japanese
citizenship when Japan recognized and signed the San Francisco Accords
treaty with South Korea (and their progeny who as a consequence are not
children of Japanese citizens and therefore are not Japanese citizens as a
consequence of birth in Japan).174 Such negative implication arising from
restricting the right to be treated as a person or human to Japanese citizens is
supported by the proposed change to the Preamble that would refer to the
special quality of the Japanese people as a “unique” society, and is
reminiscent of pre-war commentary describing western countries who
floundered in individualism as inferior to Japan’s unique society.175 It would
turn the Constitution’s role of reversing the pre-war era’s beliefs of racial
superiority on their head. This would support a return of the pre-war
Kokutai, which favored the family State under the sovereign Emperor, as
head of the Japanese house, entitled to obedience from other house
members, as well as spiritual leader and Kami under State Shinto. Here,
Japanese uniqueness (and superiority) was based on their Emperor’s and his
ancestor’s direct descent from the Sun Goddess and the people’s relationship
to other Kami and to their Emperor.176

172

See HIDETOSHI HASHIMOTO, THE PROSPECTS FOR A REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM IN
EAST ASIA 5564 (2004), for the view that fundamental human rights are universal and a list of treaties
recognizing human rights.
173
Article 97 reads: “The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of
Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for
durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate.”
NIKHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 97.
174
Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] Apr. 5, 1961, 1955 (O) 890, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO HANREISHŪ
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 1, http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=17 (holding that a Japanese woman
married in 1935 to a man of Korean ancestry—who was a Japanese resident in Japan, a citizen of pre-war
Japan, and entered into his Family Register—was denied Japanese citizenship as a result of South
Korea/Japan Peace Treaty and could not return to her father’s Japanese Family Register and lost her
Japanese citizenship).
175
See, e.g., JANSEN, supra note 29, at 642; DOWER, supra note 85, at 20305, 211, 21617.
176
See ROSS, supra note 86, at 144150; WRAY, supra note 81, at 408410, for the relationship of
rejection of individuality with Kokuta.
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Speech, Association and Other Activities Contrary to Public Order
Would Not Be Constitutionally Protected if the LDP Amendments
were Adopted

As noted above, the Supreme Court of Japan has already held that
Article 12 moderates Article 21’s grant of freedom of assembly, association,
speech, press, other forms of expression, and the contemplated amendments
seek to strengthen such moderation by emphasizing the people’s obligation
not to abuse any constitutional rights by defining abuse as actions that are
inconsistent with public interest and the public order. To drive home the
point that speech and association rights are limited to speech and association
activities that are in conformity to the public interest and public order (and
hence not an abuse of the speech and association right) an additional
paragraph would be added to Article 21 making clear that activities designed
to change the public order are outside constitutional protection. Placement
of this new paragraph in the freedom of assembly and association Article
makes clear that its purpose is not simply to restrict organizing or
demonstrating for the purpose of changing the public order but also directly
attacks speech, association, press reporting, commentary, and other
expressive forms that support change in (and hence are activities that are not
in conformity with) the existing definition of public order.177
The fear of free speech and association mirrors concerns of the early
Meiji and pre-war periods in which freedom of speech was severely
restricted by legislation that made it a crime to attempt to change the
political system. Speaking out for a different interpretation of Kokutai was
unlawful. Ideas that challenged the government’s view of public order were
silenced before they could lead to public debate.178 Consistent with Ito
Hirobumi’s understanding of the Meiji Constitution that he drafted, the
contemplated addition would draw a distinction between thought (which
would be free), and activities (such as speaking or otherwise publicizing the
thought) that would be restricted to matters consistent with upholding


177

See Repeta, supra note 44.
ELISE K. TIPTON, THE JAPANESE POLICE STATE – THE TOKKO IN INTERWAR JAPAN 6265, 132
(1990); Rare 1941 ‘Thought Police’ Training Document Discovered, MAINICHI (Aug. 2, 2015),
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150802p2a00m0na005000c.html.
178
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“public order.”179 Public order would be defined by the government as it
was in the 1930s.180
Speech and press freedoms in Japan are already significantly
limited.181 Mass demonstrations are subject to police approval under local
ordinances, although approval is usually (but not always) given because of
concern that failure to do so would violate the Constitution.182 That could
change if association for purposes of changing the public order were
excluded from constitutional protection. Moreover, the paragraph the LDP
would add to Article 12 would open the door to more restrictive regulation,
as the legislature or bureaucrats expanded the definition of public order
narrowing the space for free speech and expression. The 1947 Constitution
has not been interpreted to prohibit severe restrictions on campaign activities
and endorsements of candidates by ordinary citizens and the press during the
all-important election period immediately prior to voting.183
These
restrictions are specifically designed to limit activities that could affect the
results of the election, and thus, a newspaper editorializing or providing
information during the election period as to why it believes candidate A is
preferable to candidate B would be violating the law.184 Presently,
individual candidates in single seat districts are restricted as to how much

HIROBUMI ITO, supra note 7, at 6162.
In 1934, a Diet member objecting to proposed legislation increasing punishment for acts
inconsistent with public order noted that the change was dangerous because of the broad meaning that
could be given to “public order.” The law was enacted. See KASZA, supra note 29, at 127128.
181
See generally, GOODMAN, supra note 88, at 155179. Japan has steadily fallen in rankings of press
freedom so that it is no longer in the top sixty of the 180 countries ranked by Reporters Without Borders
(Japan was ranked at seventy-two in 2016). See Ayako Mie, Japan’s government defends against multiple
accusations
of
stifling
press
freedom,
JAPAN
TIMES, (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/21/national/japans-governmentdefends-multiple-accusations-stifling-press-freedom/#.VxlhDojD_nM.
182
See generally, Himeji city gov't apologizes for halting antiAbe gathering, MAINICHI (OCT. 1, 2015),
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20151001p2a00m0na004000c.html.
183
See, e.g., Masahiro Usaki, Restrictions on Political Campaigns in Japan, 53 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 133 (1990); Alex Klein, The Puzzle of Ineffective Election Campaigning in Japan, 12 JAPANESE J.
POL. SCI. 57, 59 (2011); Matthew J. Wilson, E-Elections: Time for Japan to Embrace Online Campaigning,
2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4 (2011), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/wilson-e-elections.pdf; see also, Matthew J.
Wilson, Essay, E-Elections: Law in Asia & Online Political Activities, 12 WYO. L. REV. 237 (2012).
184
In a recent Tokyo Governor’s race, the LDP candidate supported the LDP's position that nuclear
power plants should be restarted while the opposition candidate (former Prime Minister Hosakawa) ran on
a non-nuclear platform. A NHK news commentator resigned when the government owned station advised
him that he could not comment on questions concerning nuclear power as that could affect the election. See
Martin
Fackler,
Japan’s Public Broadcaster Faces Accusations of Shift to the Right, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2014), http://ww
w.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/world/asia/japans-public-broadcaster-faces-accusations-of-shift-to-theright.html.
179
180
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TV time they can buy. Party candidates running in both the single seat and
proportional representative contests can benefit from the party’s ability to set
forth policy positions that inure to their benefit as single seat district
candidates. This benefit to party candidates has been upheld by the judiciary
on the grounds that they support a “level playing field” in elections
notwithstanding the restrictions that actually favor party designated
candidates over independent candidates.185
The inhibiting effect of campaign speech restrictions during the
election period is demonstrated by the infamous “Tsubaki affair.” Tsubaki
was forced to resign and a media executive apologized before the Diet
because the station had expressed anti-LDP political views during the 1993
election period (the election that brought into power the first non-LDP
government since 1955).186 To ensure that news media did not similarly
disparage the LDP or its candidates, the LDP in the run up to the 2014
Lower House election wrote to the media reminding them of their duty to
remain neutral in the campaign.187 In early 2016, an Internal Affairs and
Communication Minister reminded the press that she could remove them
from the air if they failed to report news in an unbiased manner or programs
were not consistent with the public interest.188 Media outlets that own TV
and/or radio stations that do not remain neutral must be concerned about
government action when their licenses come up for renewal (generally every

185
The Court’s decision was based on the importance of political parties to Japan’s election system.
See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 23, 2011, 2010 (Gyo-Tsu) 207, 65 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ], http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1097.
186
See LISBETH CLAUSEN, GLOBAL NEWS PRODUCTION 118120 (2003); ELLIS S. KRAUSS,
BROADCASTING
POLITICS IN JAPAN: NHK AND TELEVISION NEWS 236
237 (2000); NTV head bemoans pressure over LDP
questioning, MAINICHI (Apr. 30, 2015), http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150428p2a00
m0na005000c.html.
187
See LDP letter to broadcasters urges neutral poll campaign reporting, draws criticism, JAPAN
TIMES (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/28/national/ldp-letter-broadcastersurges-neutral-poll-campaign-reporting-draws-criticism/#.VHh6Vbl0zIW.
188
See Tomohiro Osaki, Sanae Takaichi warns that government can shut down broadcasters it feels
are biased, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/09/national/politicsdiplomacy/minister-warns-that-government-can-shut-down-broadcasters-it-feels-arebiased/#.Vrp_eYf2bIX; See also Opposition slams Cabinet minister's comment on possibility of taking
(Feb.
10,
2016),
broadcasters
off
air,
MAINICHI
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160210/p2a/00m/0na/016000c; Editorial, Gov’t should not threaten
autonomy of broadcasters, MAINICHI (Feb. 10, 2016), http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160210/p2a/00m
/0na/017000c; Communications ministry defends minister's remarks about taking broadcasters off air,
MAINICHI (Feb. 13, 2016), http://mainichi.jp/english/and articles/20160213/p2a/00m/0na/009000c.
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five years).189 It is reported that the head of the government-owned
broadcaster, NHK, has instructed reporters to hew to the government line.190
Japan now ranks sixty-one out of the 180 countries ranked by Reporters
Without Borders for press freedom191 and in 2016, was criticized by the UN
Special Rapporteur for lack of press freedom.192
Self-censorship by the media, (whereby the media restricts its
reporting activities to matter that comports with government policy) a staple
of pre-war Japan, continues under Press Club membership and club “ethical
rules”193 that have standardized and eroded objective reporting while
highlighting the government's view and policies and limiting news critical of
the government.194 The Press Club system, a carry forward from the Press
Clubs of pre-war Japan, serve to enforce “self-censorship.”
The
neutrality/fairness doctrine may have contributed to the LDP’s success in the
2016 Upper House election as media outlets avoided discussion of issues
affecting the election leaving voters unaware of the significance of granting
the LDP (together with its allies favoring “constitution revisions”) a twothirds majority in the Upper House.195 Press Clubs are financially supported
by the government body they are covering, reliant on their government

189
See Gov't intervention into TV programs raises question: Can autonomy be kept?, MAINICHI (Feb.
8, 2016), http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160208/p2a/00m/0na/012000c.
190
See Tomohiro Osaki, NHK chairman's order to follow government line on Kyushu nuclear
TIMES
(Apr.
27,
2016),
reactors
sparks
outcry,
JAPAN
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/27/national/nhk-chairmans-order-follow-government-linekyushu-nuclear-reactors-sparks-outcry/#.VyUW14jD_nM.
191
See Ayako Mie, supra note 183; Toko Sekiguchi, Japan Slips in Press Freedom Ranking, WALL
S T.
J.:
JAPAN
REAL
TIME
(Feb.
13,
2015
5:40
PM
JST),
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2015/02/13/japan-slips-in-press-freedom-rankings/.
192
See Yuri Kagemaya, UN rights expert sees threats to press independence in Japan, AP: THE BIG
STORY
(Apr.
19,
2016
2:46
AM
EDT),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/d4ce117bf8484129a0280f78b5dc3b88/un-rights-expert-sees-threats-pressindependence-japan.
193
See LOUIS D. HAYES, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE POLITICS 125−127 (5th ed. 2009) for the role
of Press Clubs in limiting reporting in Japan. Among the ethical standards adopted by Press Clubs are
requirements for freedom and responsibility, wherein freedom is moderated by public interest. See The
Canon of Journalism, PRESSNET: NIHON SHINBUN KYOKAI (adopted June 21, 2000),
http://www.pressnet.or.jp/english/about/canon/. (“However, member newspapers must be duly aware of
their heavy responsibility and be constantly mindful not to impair public interests”), accuracy and fairness,
as well as decency and moderation, which includes “member newspapers … should at all times exercise
moderation and good sense” terms that can be used to limit hard hitting expose reporting and can require
neutrality on issues; Kisha Club Guidelines, PRESSNET: NIHON SHINBUN KYOKAI (revised Mar. 9, 2006),
http://www.pressnet.or.jp/english/about/guideline/; see also LAURIE ANNE FREEMAN, CLOSING THE SHOP:
INFORMATION CARTELS AND JAPAN’S MASS MEDIA (2000) (ebook); GOODMAN, supra note 88, at 165166.
194
See WILLIAM DE LANGE, A HISTORY OF JAPANESE JOURNALISM 181192 (1998); FREEMAN, supra
note 195.
195
See TV stations claim they considered fairness in lack of election coverage, MAINICHI (July 19,
2016), http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160719/p2a/00m/0na/018000c.
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sources for information, and their members do not buck the agency line for
fear of being cut out of future press conferences or information.196 Reliance
on information received at Press Club briefings is a defense to libel litigation
while reliance on reports emanating from a reputable but independent news
agency is not.197 There is little substantive investigative reporting in Japan
because the Press Club’s hand-fed news is free from challenge in litigation
and therefore enables news outlets to retain their favored status as Press
Club members.198 Assuming adoption of the amendment to the free speech
Article, the critical question for Japanese news outlets would be whether
reporting of embarrassing events or commentary critical of government
policy, positions, or leaders, would be constitutionally protected, or whether
such reporting and editorializing could be considered contrary to the public
interest or public order. If reporting is outside public interest or order it
lacks the protection of Article 12’s free speech right. While such reporting
may be considered acceptable today, at a future date could be considered
contrary to public interest or public order, as was the case with Professor
Minobe. The clearly ambiguous terms “public interest" and “public order”
likely would result in even more self-censorship than currently exists.199 In
the long term, these restrictions could even be extended to permit the
government to censor books, much like in the pre-war era when the
publications ordinance permitted the Home Ministry to censor books on the
basis that they disturbed public order or corrupted morals.200
The limits on speech, press, and association that Japan’s government
already imposes are moderated by the 1947 Constitution’s speech, press, and

196

See generally, ADAM GAMBLE & TAKESATO WATANABE, A PUBLIC BETRAYED: AN INSIDE LOOK
4566 (2004); see also FREEDOM IN
THE WORLD 2006: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 369 (Aili Piano, Arch
Puddington & Mark E. Rosenberg eds., 2006) (describing Japan’s Press Club System as an “obstacle” to
press freedom in Japan).
197
See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 29, 2002, 1995 (O) 1421, 56 Saikō Saibansho minji hanreishū
[Minshū] 185.
198
See, e.g., William Nester, Japan's Recruit Scandal: Government and Business for Sale, 12 THIRD
WORLD QUARTERLY 91, 9697 (Apr., 1990). Self-censorship has become so ubiquitous in Japan that the
European Union has formally urged Japan to abandon the Press Club system. See Jonathan Watts, EU acts
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
29,
2002),
to
free
Japanese
media,
THE
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/29/worlddispatch.pressandpublishing.
199
See David McNeill, Japan’s contemporary media, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN
64, 6473 (Jeff Kingston ed., 2014); Linda Sieg, Journalists In Japan Say There Is Growing Pressure To
Self-Censor, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/24/japanese-media-selfcenso_n_6741558.html.
200
See, e.g., Emily Anderson, Tamura Naoomi's The Japanese Bride: Christianity, Nationalism, and
Family in Meiji Japan, 34 JAPANESE J. RELIGIOUS STUD. 203, 215 (2007).
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association clauses. The new language sought would remove the moderating
influence of the constitutional free speech right by only guaranteeing speech,
press, and association rights to matter in the public interest or consistent with
public order. Current government efforts to control information affect
Japanese textbooks as the Ministry of Education has a dominating position
concerning which textbooks are used and what they may say.201 The
Ministry claims that it acts to assure “historic fact” but its view of historic
fact is frequently contested both domestically202 and internationally.203 A
2015 survey concluded that only five percent of Japanese respondents knew
a great deal about Japan's twentieth century wars.204 Japan’s history of

201
The Occupations efforts to move textbook decisions from the national to the local level was not
successful. See Masayuki Uchino, The Struggle for Educational Freedom, in FIVE DECADES OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 115, 117118 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001); see also
CHRISTOPHER BARNARD, LANGUAGE, IDEOLOGY, AND JAPANESE HISTORY TEXTBOOKS 1012 (2003);
YOSHIKO NOZAKI, WAR MEMORY, NATIONALISM AND EDUCATION IN POSTWAR JAPAN, 19452007: THE
JAPANESE HISTORY TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY AND IENAGA SABURO’S COURT CHALLENGES 1325 (2008)
(ebook); JAMES L. MCCLAIN, JAPAN: A MODERN HISTORY 592593 (2002); Editorial, Dark facts in Japan's
history all the more important to keep in schoolbooks,
ASAHI
SHIMBUN
(2015), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201501220036; Hane & Perez, supra note 3, at 448
449.
202
Okinawans objected and protested when the Ministry of Education sought to delete from
textbooks references to the Military’s role in civilian suicides during the Battle of Okinawa. The Ministry
backed down. See Isabel Reynolds, Okinawans urge textbook "truth" on WW2 suicides, REUTERS (Oct. 3,
2007),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/10/03/uk-japan-okinawa-suicide-idUKT1253320071003;
Norimitsu Onishi, Japan texts note army's role in suicides, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 27, 2007),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-12-27/news/0712260467_1_suicides-textbooks-okinawa.
203
See Alexander Martin, U.S. Publisher Rebuffs Japan on ‘Comfort Women’ Revision ‘Scholars
Aligned Behind Historical Fact’ of Forced Prostitution, McGraw-Hill Education Says, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
15, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-publisher-rejects-japan-over-textbook-on-comfort-women1421299438; Justin McCurry, Japan urges US publisher to remove comfort women from textbooks,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/15/japan-urges-us-publisherdelete-references-comfort-women; Hajimu Takeda, Ministry contacts foreign correspondent about source
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See, e.g., Yomiuri Shimbun, Poll: 81% regard Japan as ‘peace-loving nation’, JAPAN NEWS (Feb.
25, 2015), http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0001958156; Hiroshi Mitani, Writing History Text Books
in Japan, in HISTORY TEXTBOOKS AND THE WARS IN ASIA: DIVIDED MEMORIES 193, 201202 (Gi-Wook
Shin & Daniel C. Sneider, eds., 2011) (ebook); Mark Driscoll, Kobayashi Noshinori is Dead: Imperial
War/Sick Liberal Peace/Neoliberal Class War, in 4 MECHADEMIA: WAR TIME 290, 299300 (Frenchy
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22, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/22/us-japan-okinawa-suicides-idUST29903020070622;
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dealing with reporters who contest the government’s view205 and its efforts
to suppress and hide inconvenient historical facts (such as its continued
denial of the terms of a side agreement with the United States concerning
Okinawa—even after the United States had declassified and made the
agreement public), as well as its increased use of State Secrets laws to place
government documents out of reach, casts a dark shadow on what could be
censored in the name of public order.206
Even the Constitutional
Referendum Law, which sets the conditions for a referendum on
constitutional changes voted by a two-thirds majority of each house, restricts
free speech dealing with amendments pending Congressional votes. Special
permanent residents are prohibited from speaking out against constitutional
changes by advising their neighbors what the effect of amendments on noncitizens could be.207 The LDP-contemplated amendment would give
government a free hand to legislate and administratively define the public
interest and public order which speech, press, and association could not
challenge.
v.

Making the Family the Basic Unit of Society and Requiring Family
Members to Take Care of Each Other

Under the iye family system, the extended clan family was the basic
unit of society. As a consequence, marriage was arranged between families.
Article 24 of the Constitution changed this by making marriage dependent
on the consent of the two sexes and by seeking to establish equality between
husband and wife as the basis for laws dealing with marriage, family

205
See, e.g., Nishiyama Official Secrets Case, Nishiyama v. Japan, 32 Keishu 457 (Sup. Ct., P.B.
May 31, 1978); Ayako Mie, Ex-Mainichi reporter blasts Abe’s push for secrets bill, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 15,
2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/11/15/national/ex-mainichi-reporter-blasts-abes-push-forsecrets-bill/#.Vqle74f2bIV.
206
Jiji Press, Japan documents classified as state secrets up over a third in 2015, top 272,000, JAPAN
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/27/national/crime-legal/japandocuments-classified-state-secrets-third-2015-top-272000/#.V-dIDJMrKqC; Documents Concerning Secret
Pacts Missing, YOMIURI (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20100113TDY02308.htm;
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http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201003180400.html; Okinawa reversion papers ‘likely destroyed’:
Documents disposed of to avoid exposing details: court, JAPAN TIMES (July 14, 2014),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/14/national/okinawa-reversion-papers-likelydestroyed/#.Vled53arTIU.
207
While political participation such as by voting or running for office may be limited to citizens,
speech concerning the effect of laws or constitutional change is not political participation. It is speech
whose ideas can be accepted or rejected by the voting public, i.e. citizens. See PAUL CLOSE & DAVID
ASKEW, ASIA PACIFIC AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE (2004).
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obligations, and inheritance. 208 Passage of the amendment would not only
provide a pathway to revive Kokutai, but would remove the constitutional
prohibition against legislation promoting the recreation of a twenty-first
century feudal iye for all Japanese families.209
The Japanese negotiators objected strenuously to the substance of the
American-drafted Constitution as it affected the individual and the family as
they sought to retain the iye system.210 While the 1947 Constitution replaces
the clan with the nuclear family, retention of the family register, which
retains the house terminology and requires that there be a head of house, and
inheritance laws that are linked to family and ancestor worship, allow the
idea of the iye to remain.211
Unlike the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [hereinafter
“Universal Declaration”], which recognizes the individual as a prime holder
of human rights and the family as “the natural and fundamental group unit of
society,” the LDP contemplates making the family the “basic unit of
society”212 rather than simply the preeminent or fundamental group unit in

208

Raising the question whether only heterosexual marriage has been constitutionalized in Japan.
Legislation will likely answer questions raised by the amendment such as whether the family will
remain the nuclear as distinguished from clan family; will it include de facto families or only families that
are recorded in the Family Register, etc., opening the door to recreation of the prewar family that placed
women in their historic role as “good wife and wise mother.” See BRIAN J. MCVEIGH, NATIONALISMS OF
JAPAN: MANAGING AND MYSTIFYING IDENTITY 219239 (2006). A government minister’s comments that
could be interpreted as blaming women for Japan’s declining population, likely echoes the “good wife and
wise mother” ethic and is consistent with earlier statements by Japanese leaders such as that the declining
birth rate was caused by the fact that Japanese women were highly educated. Women Could Contribute to
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Harmonious', 13 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 95, 110 (2010) (using the Imperial Rescript on Education as its guide
good wives were obedient to their husband and there was division of labor between husband and wife - he
pursuing matters outside the home and she matters inside the home); Koyama Shizuko and Gabriel A.
Sylvain, The "Good Wife and Wise Mother" Ideology in Post-World War I Japan, 7 U.S.-JAPAN WOMEN'S
JOURNAL, English Supplement 31 (1994) (adding to a woman's inside the home function the housewife
ideal while permitting her outside activities that did not interfere with housewife obligations and arguing
that notwithstanding women's entry into the work force the concept resonated in 1994 Japanese society).
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See KYOKO INOUE, supra note 8.
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CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 3233 (2000); see also, Christopher S. Thompson, Book Review, 10 SOC. SCI.
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the class of numerous group units of society, while at the same time
denigrating the individual from its role as prime holder of rights. The
Universal Declaration recognizes that in the hierarchy of units (employment
group, social club group, university class and/or alumni group, etc.) the
family is particularly important—but not more important than the
individuals who make up the family. The contemplated amendment would
make the family the fundamental societal unit, displacing the individual as
was the case in Tokugawa Japan,213 and as it was strengthened in Meiji
Japan, where the communal family and the Emperor's communal family
(i.e., the family State) each replicated the other.214 This would be consistent
with the earlier discussed amendment that would denigrate individual rights
by removing individuality from the Constitution. Passage of the amendment
would not only provide a pathway to revive Kokutai, but would remove the
constitutional prohibition against legislation promoting the recreation of a
twenty-first century feudal iye for all Japanese families.215

Engagement, supra note 44. By providing that “everyone” has fundamental human rights and “no one”
shall be denied certain rights (e.g., Article 215) the Declaration reaffirms individual rights while making
the family group (as distinguished from some other group, e.g., the company, school class, national society,
etc.) the fundamental group of society in Article 16. The considered amendment to Article 24 would
provide that the family, as distinguished from the individuals in both the family and society at large, is the
basic unit of society.
213
For example, criminal law in villages in feudal Japan was enforced by the goningumi (five
families) system of shared responsibility that made each member of the five family group a guarantor of the
good conduct of other group members. DAVID J. LU, THE DAWN OF HISTORY TO THE LATE TOKUGAWA
PERIOD, 209210 (1997).
214
SUSAN D. HALLOWAY, WOMEN AND FAMILY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 3031 (2010).
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placed women in their historic role as “good wife and wise mother”. See BRIAN J. MCVEIGH,
NATIONALISMS OF JAPAN: MANAGING AND MYSTIFYING IDENTITY 219239 (2004). A government
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echoes the “good wife and wise mother” ethic and is consistent with earlier statements by Japanese leaders
blaming declining birth rate on the fact that Japanese women were highly educated. Women Could
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note 214, at 4; see also Sumiko Sekiguchi, Confucian Morals and the Making of a 'Good Wife and Wise
Mother': From 'Between Husband and Wife there is Distinction' to 'As Husbands and Wives be
Harmonious', 13 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 95, 110 (2010) (using the Imperial Rescript on Education as its guide,
good wives were obedient to their husbands and there was division of labor between husband and wife, he
pursuing matters outside the home, she pursuing matters inside the home); Koyama Shizuko & Gabriel A.
Sylvain, The "Good Wife and Wise Mother" Ideology in Post-World War I Japan, 7 U.S.-JAPAN WOMEN'S
JOURNAL, English Supplement 31 (1994) (adding to a woman's inside-the-home-function the housewife
ideal while permitting her to participate in outside activities that did not interfere with housewife
obligations and arguing that notwithstanding women's entry into the work force the concept resonated in
1994 Japanese society).
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The Imperial Household Law [hereinafter “the Law”] provides a
glimpse of what a modern iye could look like. The exclusiveness of male
imperial succession reflects the iye requirement of male inheritance of the
head of house mantle to continue the family’s existence.216 The Law’s
requirement that a female of the Emperor’s line who marries outside the
imperial line be jettisoned from the imperial family also reflects the feudal
iye.217 The imperial family is in some ways a “role model” for the “proper
Japanese family.” Its discrimination against female family members and
offspring may reflect a societal norm making sexual equality difficult to
achieve.
The contemplated amendment would also require family members to
care for each other—a reflection of the feudal iye. Adoption of the
amendment could relieve the government of a serious strain on tax revenues.
Care extends beyond finance and includes custodial care, an obligation that
falls to women in modern Japan.218 With an aging and declining population
but more female university graduates, some in Japan’s government
recognize that women are a viable alternative to importing labor from
abroad. An accommodation has been made between those in the ruling elite
who consider women as “baby making machines” and those who see them

216

FUMIE KUMAGAI & DONNA J. KEYSER, UNMASKING JAPAN TODAY: THE IMPACT OF TRADITIONAL
VALUES ON MODERN JAPANESE SOCIETY 1516 (1996). Male primogeniture, under which the eldest son
inherited the head of house position, was part of the iye. WILLIAM NOEL, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN JAPAN 60
(1997). Meiji Japan allowed a female to inherit the head of house status if there were no male heirs.
217
THE IMPERIAL HOUSE LAW, art. 12, http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/hourei-01.html. As a
consequence, her children are not in the line of succession. Emperor Akihito has two sons and a daughter.
His married daughter is no longer in the Imperial family; any children she may have will not be in the
Imperial line. The Crown Prince is married and has a daughter. His younger brother was the father of two
girls when the daughter of the crown prince was born. Dynastic succession was at risk as surrogate
pregnancy, birth to a concubine, or adoption is not allowed for succession. Amendment of The Imperial
House Law was considered, including allowing females in the imperial family to create cadet families
whose male members would be available for succession. Agreement could not be reached. It appears no
serious consideration was given to allowing for an Empress (although Article 14 of the Constitution
prohibits gender discrimination in political, economic, or social relations). Consistent with the role of
younger sons in feudal Japan to father a standby head of house in waiting, the Crown Prince’s sister-in-law
at age 39 delivered a son who is the dynastic successor in the generation after the Crown Prince. The
problem may arise again if the young heir apparent after the Crown Prince fails to produce a male heir.
WINKLER, supra note 78, at 2535; Colin P.A. Jones, And then there was one?: Japan’s Right Royal Crisis,
JAPAN TIMES, (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2012/01/17/issues/and-then-therewas-one-japans-right-royal-crisis/#.VG5KyLl0xjo.
218
Kumiko Fujimura-Fanselow, The Japanese Ideology of 'Good Wives and Wise Mothers': Trends in
Contemporary Research, 3 GENDER AND HISTORY 345, 348 (1991) (noting that Japanese leaders continue
to promote the ideology that care is the provenance of daughters and daughters-in-law). FujimuraFanselow also ties the iye and imperial Emperor and the House system to the concept of the Good Wife and
Wise Mother in the prewar and war period.
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as a national resource for other reasons.219 New laws designed to ease the
burden of working women have provided some access to child care centers
and maternity and child care leave laws have recently been enacted. Even
Japan’s definition of gender discrimination has been modified to some
degree to relieve the on-the-job burden of working women. These laws have
had a positive effect; but waiting lists for child care centers are long220 and
social acceptance is far from universal.221 Japan’s definition of gender
discrimination has been moderated in some work settings so that the general
rule, which does not recognize gender (or any other) discrimination as long
as the law is facially neutral,222 has been moderated to recognize “indirect
discrimination” (what in United States law would be “effect discrimination”)
when employers use dual track (career/non-career) hiring systems.223
Adoption of the contemplated amendment will, as a practical if not legal

219

Japan women called child machines, BBC NEWS, (Jan. 27, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/6306685.stm.
220
Isabel Reynolds, Lack of Childcare is Hurting Japanese Push to Put More Women to Work,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-30/japan-schildcare-backlog-hampers-abe-push-to-put-women-to-work.
221
See, e.g., Jonathan Soble, To Rescue Economy, Japan Turns to Supermom, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 1,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/02/business/international/in-economic-revival-effort-japan-turnsto-its-women.html?mwrsm=Email&_r=0 (noting the difficulty of getting Japanese corporate and societal
culture to change and ease the path for working women); Mark Fabian, Childcare not the only cost for
ASIA
FORUM,
(Sept.
16
2014),
working
women
in
Japan,
EAST
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/09/16/childcare-not-the-only-cost-for-working-women-in-japan/.
222
For example, since either the husband or wife’s family name can be chosen for a family name at
marriage, the Family Register Law requirement of a single family name is constitutional notwithstanding
that over 95% of Japanese families register under the husband’s family name. Tomohiro Osaki, Japan's
top court upholds the same-name rule for married couples, overturns remarriage moratorium for women,
JAPAN TIMES, (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/16/national/crime-legal/japanstop-court-strikes-rules-divorcee-remarriage/#.Vqu1Dof2bIV. On its face, the law is neutral – societal
pressures likely cause the large difference between men and women. Professional women are especially
harmed by the law’s requirement that such women choose between marriage under the new husband’s
surname and the reputation they have established under their father’s surname. Many social welfare
policies such as the subsidy for large families and health care are linked to and paid to the head of house.
These policies disadvantage the wife who finds it difficult to leave an unhappy marriage because benefits
flow through the husband. It is reported that in reaching its decision the Court referred to both the societal
history of a single family name (this arises from the iye clan family system) and also noted that single
family names “enable” a person to inform others that they are part of a family. Id. Of course, the law does
far more than enable people – it requires women to inform others that they are part of their husband’s
family – as the prewar iye required.
223
Under recent legislation, “indirect discrimination” is recognized so that Japanese employers who
employ two track hiring systems (one track for career—management—positions, overwhelmingly held by
men, and a second track for non-career positions held by part-timers and contract workers, predominantly
women) must prove necessity when adopting: a) height, weight, and strength requirements; b) promotion
practices based on experience at multiple locations; and c) willingness to transfer to numerous locations, as
condition for career track hiring. These last reflect the cultural imperative that women are expected to stay
where the children are and not move the family home. See GOODMAN, supra note 88, at 208211.
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matter, further burden women’s opportunities in Japan and might set back
hard fought gains as women would once again lose their individual rights
and be subsumed by their family obligations and second class status within
the family.224
Making the family the basic unit of Japanese society should not be
viewed in isolation. It relates to the contemplated change to remove
individuality from the Constitution and to make the Emperor Head of State.
Under the iye, there was no personal individuality and little individual
property. Individuality was lost in the communal body of the clan family
where personal attachments, wants, and desires were superseded by the good
of the communal family, and after the Restoration, subordinate to the
interests of the family State.225 Removal of individuality and designation of
the family as the basic unit of society may be based on a desire to recreate,
to the extent possible in a modern world, the iye system reestablishing the
“pure nature” of the Japanese state that existed in the Meiji period when
such purity and Kokutai was related to both the family system and rejection
of individualism.226 To those who may seek to return all Japanese to one
family under a Head of state emperor, the concept of iye, with its ties to
ancestor worship as a link to the Emperor, is central to the Family State227
and Kokutai.228
vi.

Amendment by Cabinet Declaration? Article 9 and Renunciation of
War

Article 9 of the Constitution is an illustration of “be careful what you
wish for, you may get it.” In Article 9 Japan renounces war and the threat of
force to resolve international disputes. 229 War potential such as the army,

224
By placing such a provision in the Constitution, courts likely would be presented with the
argument that a statutory requirement of non-sex discrimination in the work environment must be weighed
against the constitutional requirement for family care – a woman’s duty. Prime Minister Abe’s goal is to
have women occupy seven percent for national public servants and fifteen percent for local government
officials. That goal is nowhere near achievement. Mizuho Aoki, Japan Drastically Lowers its Goal for
Female Managers in Government and Private Sector, JAPAN TIMES, (Dec. 25, 2015),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/25/national/japan-drastically-lowers-its-goal-for-femalemanagers-in-government-and-private-sector/#.VqvZvYf2bIV.
225
Smith, supra note 78, at 33; KENNETH B. PYLE, JAPAN RISING 120125 (2007).
226
DOWER, supra note 85, at 221223 (discussing the Ministry of Education Manual Cardinal
Principles of the National Polity (Kokutai)); Fundamentals of Our National Polity, excerpts and discussion
at Tsunoda et. al., supra note 29, at 278288.
227
Kawamura, supra note 77, at 156.
228
QUIGLEY & TURNER, supra note 89, at 140, 157.
229
KENPO, art. 9 provides:
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navy, and air force are not to be maintained, and the State’s right of
belligerency is not recognized.230 No mention is made of Japan’s right to
defend itself against outside attack or to enter into mutual or collective
defense treaties.
At the start of the Occupation, disarmament and policies that
prevented Japan from again becoming a military power was uppermost in
the mind of the Occupation. The Initial Post Surrender Policy Directive (IPS
Directive JCS1380/15) called for Japanese demilitarization and
disarmament.231 The Cold War changed the geopolitical situation and as
United States policy towards the Far East and as the perceived Soviet threat
developed, Article 9 became an impediment to America’s containment
policy.232
The Ashida Amendment to Article 9, which added language that
hinged the prohibition of a Japanese military force to aspiration for
international peace and also hinged the prohibition of military force to
carrying out the aims of international peace, made room for the argument
that it is an aggressive military rather than a defensive military that is
prohibited.233 Prohibiting aggression is consistent with the Kellogg Briand
Pact, a source from which the concept of Renunciation of War was
borrowed.234 Article 9 has been interpreted by the Japanese government to

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never
be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
The Ashida Amendment adopted by the Diet and accepted by the Occupation consists of the 11 words of
the first paragraph (Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,) and the first
10 words of the second paragraph (In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,).
230
Id.
231
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, BASIC DIRECTIVE FOR POST-SURRENDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN
JAPAN PROPER (Nov. 3, 1945) http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/036/036tx.html.
232
HOWARD B. SCHONBERGER, AFTERMATH OF WAR 240–278 (1989).
233
The Ashida Amendment added the following language to the American draft. Article 9 as set out
in KENPO supra note 229: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,” and “In
order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph.”
234
The draft Constitution for the Philippines written in 1935 contained a Renunciation of War clause
and McArthur’s close ties to the Philippines suggest he was aware of the renunciation clause. KOSEKI
SHOICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 82–86 (Ray A. Moore trans., 1997); see also
Office of the Historian, The Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/kellogg; Henry Cabot Lodge, The Kellogg-Briand Peace
Pact: A Contemporary Criticism, 1928–29, TEACHING AMERICAN HISTORY (Dec. 1928),
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permit Japan’s Self Defense Force (SDF), although the role of the SDF is
restrained by the Constitution, legislation, and administrative opinion by the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), the organ of government with
responsibility to advise the government (i.e., the Cabinet) concerning
whether legislation or administrative action is consistent with the
Constitution.235 CLB is a standalone government bureau under the Prime
Minister; the opinions of the CLB are given great weight by all branches of
the government—legislative, executive and judicial. It has been suggested
that opinions of the CLB are so significant that the Supreme Court of Japan
follows them rather than its own view.236 Recent debate in Japan has
focused not on the legality of the existence of the SDF but on what use may
be made of such force, where it may be deployed, who it may defend, what
weapons it may possess, and how much force it can apply.
The Abe Administration initially sought to amend Article 9 by way of
a two-step process. In the first step, Article 96 (the amendment Article)
would be changed to require only a majority vote of each Diet house to send
amendments to referendum; once that was achieved, step two would be to
significantly amend Article 9.237 When polls indicated the Japanese public
would not support this path, the debate shifted from formal amendment to
achieving the government’s objective by the Government simply adopting a
new and different interpretation of Article 9.238 Assuming interpretation
sufficient, the debate shifted to what was the relevant body to make such
new interpretation. The competing bodies were the CLB and the Cabinet.
Consistent with Japanese government policy to use Article 9 to limit
Japan’s military budget and commitments to allied countries such as the

http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/the-kellogg-briand-peace-pact-a-contemporarycriticism-1928-29/.
235
The Supreme Court of Japan has never directly addressed the question of the constitutionality of
the SDF, avoiding the issue through procedural doctrines although dicta indicate the SDF is constitutional.
Questions concerning the scope and limitations on the SDF have been opined on by the CLB. See About the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, http://www.clb.go.jp/english/about.html.
236
Jonathon David Marshall, Democratizing the Law in Japan, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
JAPANESE POLITICS 92, 94 (Alisa Gaunder, ed., 2011); Jun-ichi Satoh, Judicial Review in Japan: An
Overview of the Case Law and an Examination of Trends in the Japanese Supreme Court’s Constitutional
Oversight, 41 LOY. L. REV. 603, 605, 624625 (2008).
237
This had the advantage of using fear of an assertive and resurgent China and a reclusive but
nuclear North Korea to rid the Constitution of both the two-thirds threshold required by Article 96 and to
“liberate” Japan from restrictions on its use of military forces.
238
Jeremy A. Yellen, Shinzo Abe’s Constitutional Ambitions, THE DIPLOMAT, (June 12, 2014),
http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/shinzo-abes-constitutional-ambitions/.
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United States,239 the CLB had previously opined that Article 9 limited
military action to the minimum necessary for Japan’s defense and that
collective self-defense was not permitted.240 To achieve a shift in the CLB’s
interpretation, Prime Minister Abe filled a vacancy on the Supreme Court
with the head of the CLB (who opposed reinterpretation of Article 9) and
then appointed a non-CLB member (who favored changing the interpretation
of Article 9) to head the CLB.241 When the new head became seriously ill,
the government changed its approach to one that rejected a role of the CLB
in the interpretation question and instead relied on a new Cabinet
interpretation of Article 9. 242
A “Cabinet Declaration” is not mentioned in the Constitution, which
makes the Diet, not the Cabinet, the highest and sole law-making branch of
the State.243 The Cabinet declared that Article 9 permitted the SDF to
engage in collective self-defense, i.e., to aid other countries in certain
circumstances, including military attack on the assets of such foreign nations
and other circumstances that endangered the Japanese population’s pursuit
of happiness.244 An embargo of oil such as the pre-Pacific War American

239

See Michael J. Green, The US-Japan Alliance: A Brief Strategic History, 12 EDUC. ABOUT ASIA
25 (2007).
240
PYLE, supra note 225, at 236, 254–255; EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY & IAN E. RINEHART, CONG.
RESEARCH
SERV.,
RL33740,
THE
U.S.-JAPAN
ALLIANCE,
(2016),
available
at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf; see also Michael Green, The Challenges of Managing US-Japan
Security Relations after the Cold War, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS 241 (Gerald L.
Curtis ed. 2000), http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/NewPerspectives/new_green.pdf.
241
Yellen, supra note 238.
242
Reiji Yoshida, Abe’s man in Cabinet law office steps down, JAPAN TIMES, (May 16, 2014),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/05/16/national/politics-diplomacy/cabinet-law-office-shake-slowabes-military-drive/#.U-GPFSx0wdU.
243
“The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the
State.” NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 41 (Japan). The Diet is the organ of the State
whose entire membership is elected by the people. Only a majority of the Cabinet need be elected members
of the Diet, and all Cabinet members are appointed by the Prime Minister, who has authority to remove
them at will: “[t]he Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. However, a majority of their
number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet. The Prime Minister may remove the
Ministers of State as he chooses.” Id. art. 68.
244
Three conditions for exercising collective self-defense were placed in the Declaration: 1) a clear
threat to Japan and/or its peoples’ rights to life, liberty or pursuit of happiness; 2) collective self-defense
must be the only alternative available; 3) force is limited to minimum necessary force. CHANLETT-AVERY
& RINEHART, supra note 240, at 4; see also Jeff Kingston, Commentary, Abe’s constitutional putsch and
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(July
12,
2014),
U.S.
security
cooperation,
JAPAN
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/07/12/commentary/abes-constitutional-putsch-u-s-securitycooperation/#.U-FqiSx0wdU.
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Embargo or a cut off of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf that could be
interpreted to endanger the public’s right to happiness might suffice to set
aside Article 9’s Renunciation of War Clause.245 No opinion of the CLB on
the constitutionality of such declaration was sought and when the CLB was
presented with the declaration it took no formal action and kept no notes of
any discussions it may have had concerning the declaration246 (although
there is strong argument that Japan’s public records law requires the keeping
of such notes) apparently simply accepting it as a fait accompli.247 The Diet
(controlled by the LDP and Komeito) then adopted legislation expanding the
role of the SDF in accord with the declaration.
The declaration does not contain a NATO type “attack on one is an
attack on all” commitment and leaves to Japan’s government both the
ultimate questions of whether an attack on a country allied with Japan meets
the Cabinet declaration’s required clear threat to Japan’s sovereignty or the
right of its people to pursue happiness and the level of military action Japan
may take in response.248 The declaration is supportive of United States
policy and the Japan/U.S. Alliance and was welcomed by United States

245
Prime Minister Abe has suggested Japan could use mine sweepers as part of collective selfdefense if mines interrupted global oil supplies interfering with citizen’s pursuit of happiness. Collective
NEWS
(July
14,
2014),
http://the-japandefense
right
limited:
Abe,
JAPAN
news.com/news/article/0001423669. The defense of some of the defendants at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial
was based, in part, on the assertion that the United States rather than Japan began the Pacific War as the
U.S. embargo of high octane aviation fuel was an act of economic warfare. For more on Koichi Kido’s use
of this defense argument at the War Crimes Trial, see EDWARD J. MILLER, BANKRUPTING THE ENEMY 242
(2007). This argument disregards the actions of Japan leading up to the embargo (Japan’s aggressive war in
China and Japanese expansion to French Indochina) and disregards the difference between a blockade,
which is an Act of War because it relies on belligerency, i.e., military force, to prevent willing sellers from
selling product to a belligerent, while an embargo is a country’s voluntary restriction of its own actions and
the actions of those subject to its domestic law from exporting product to a foreign state. At the time of the
U.S. embargo, there was no international agreement between Japan and the United States that required the
United States to permit its nationals to trade with Japan. There is no rule of international law that requires a
country, absent a treaty obligation to the contrary, to cede its freedom to refuse to trade with another
country because the other country “needs” the products the embargoing country refuses to sell. Abe’s
comment echoing Japan’s prewar actions reflects a theory of entitlement that international law does not
support. See FORREST E. MORGAN, COMPELLENCE AND STRATEGIC CULTURE OF IMPERIAL JAPAN 174
(2003).
246
Cabinet Legislation Bureau has no record of Constitution reinterpretation deliberations,
(Sept.
21,
2015),
MAINICHI
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150928p2a00m0na035000c.html.
247
Government skipped recording debate over constitutional reinterpretation, JAPAN TIMES (Sept.
28, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/28/national/politics-diplomacy/government-skippedrecording-debate-over-constitutional-reinterpretation/.
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North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
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officials.249 The declaration and security legislation passed to carry out the
declaration may reflect a break with Japan’s historic use of Article 9 to limit
its commitments to allies (the United States in particular). It is an advance
towards the United States objective of a truly mutual defense agreement and
mutual defense commitments between the United States and Japan which
permits Japan to shoot down missiles headed toward the United States and
defend United States military assets.250 It also reflects a Japan that has
become much more involved with like-minded countries, i.e., those
concerned about China.251 While retaining the importance of self-defense
(i.e., defense of Japanese territory or its people) as a prerequisite for
Japanese military action,252 adoption of a collective self-defense posture is a

249
Hagel Welcomes Japan’s New Collective Self-defense Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. NEWS (July 1,
2014), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122591; CHANLETT-AVERY & RINEHART, supra
note 240, at 4.
250
The issue of how far the Cabinet Declaration permits Japanese military action is one for the
Japanese government to decide. The joint U.S.-Japan military guidelines were amended in April 2015.
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, U.S.-Japan (April 27, 2015), http://www.us.embjapan.go.jp/english/html/Guidelines_for_Japan_US_Defense_Cooperation.pdf; see also Kyle Mizokami,
Inside the New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, USNI NEWS (April 29, 2015),
https://news.usni.org/2015/04/29/inside-the-new-u-s-japan-defense-guidelines. The revised guidelines take
into account Japan’s new approach to collective self-defense and joint Naval Operations and Drills
undertaken by Japan, and the United States will help interpret (and perhaps expand) the Guidelines. See
Bruce Klinger, Japanese Defense Reform Supports Allied Security Objectives, BACKGROUNDER (The
Heritage Foundation) (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/01/japanese-defensereform-supports-allied-security-objectives.
251
See, e.g., Brahma Chellaney, China pushes natural allies India, Japan closer to US, THE SUNDAY
GUARDIAN (May 30, 2010), http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/china-pushes-natural-allies-indiajapan-closer-to-us; Mina Pollmann, Japan and India's Warming Defense Ties, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 4,
2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/japan-and-indias-warming-defense-ties/; Prashanth Parameswaran,
Japanese Destroyers Visit Vietnam’s Cam Ranch Bay in Historic Move, THE DIPLOMAT (Apr. 13, 2016),
http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/japanese-destroyers-visit-vietnams-cam-ranh-bay-in-historic-move/; Kim
Gamel, US, South Korea and Japan to Hold Anti-Missile Exercise, STARS AND STRIPES (May 16, 2016),
http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/us-south-korea-and-japan-to-hold-anti-missile-exercise-1.409754.
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Green, supra note 239. It must be emphasized that in determining what collective self-defense
actions are permitted by the Declaration restrictions in the Declaration and legislation still contain restraints
on the use of the military (e.g., minimum force necessary). See To win over Komeito, LDP modifies rules
for Japan's use of force, NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW (June 24, 2016), http://asia.nikkei.com/PoliticsEconomy/Policy-Politics/To-win-over-New-Komeito-LDP-modifies-rules-for-Japan-s-use-of-force. Such
restraints reinforce the “go slow” attitude Japan’s political leaders have endorsed for seventy years, raising
questions about how much collective self-defense Japan will actually exercise when and if assets of a
country close to Japan (e.g., the United States) are attacked. See Adam P. Liff, Japan’s Defense Policy: Abe
the Evolutionary, 38 THE WASH. Q. 79, 85–92, 94 (2015); see also Michael Green and Jeffrey W. Hornung,
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significant break from Japan’s postwar past. At the same time, Japan’s
government is also taking action to scale back the role of civilian watchdogs
while increasing the authority of military officers.253 This may make it
easier and faster for Japan to come to the aid of an allied country but it
reduces civilian control over the military.
The Cabinet declaration raises severe rule of law questions,254
especially as the declaration route replaced a legal opinion255 without
providing any reasoned explanation of why the interpretation of Article 9
accepted by governments headed by LDP as well as other political parties
for seventy years and supported by opinions of the CLB has suddenly
changed.256 By avoiding use of the Amendment Article (Article 96) to
change the meaning of Article 9, Japan’s government has engaged in a form
of “stealth amendment” of the Constitution, depriving the people of their
right to be protected against Government action changing long established
principles set out in the Constitution.257 If seventy years of consistent
constitutional interpretation by the government and the bureau with
responsibility for giving constitutional interpretations that conditions the

Ten Myths About Japan’s Collective Self-Defense Change, THE DIPLOMAT (July 10, 2014),
http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/ten-myths-about-japans-collective-self-defense-change/.
253
Defense Ministry's new SDF planning procedures give uniformed personnel more control,
MAINICHI (Mar. 12, 2016), http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160312/p2a/00m/0na/021000c; Nina
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military to self-defense and thus the Ashida Amendment can be blinked
away by the declaration of the executive branch acting on its own, can such
declarations be used to “amend” other constitutional provisions such as the
freedoms and rights provisions of the Constitution? If so, what is the
function of a written constitution’s Bill of Rights and amendment provisions
and how does the public cabin Cabinet declared interpretations? The history
of Article 9 has been a history of incremental interpretations expanding the
role of Japan’s Self Defense Force but never tampering with the self-defense
rationale for the forces existence and use. Does this history make
interpretation of Article 9 sui generous?258 Of course, a party with a legal
injury caused by government action and standing to sue may seek a judicial
determination that such action (not raising a political question) should be set
aside as unconstitutional. Japan’s Supreme Court is specifically given
constitutional judicial review authority259 but rarely exercises it.260
In the run up to the legislation carrying out the Cabinet Declaration a
Supreme Court Justice,261 a former Chief Justice,262 as well as three
constitutional scholars invited to testify before a Diet Committee (including
one who the LDP had asked to testify) opined that the legislation was
unconstitutional.263
The Supreme Court of Japan, using procedural
doctrines, has never directly addressed the question of the constitutionality
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of the SDF; although Supreme Court dicta indicate the SDF is constitutional.
Considering the Court’s reticence to deal with constitutional issues the CLB
has taken this role and is considered by some as a guardian of the
Constitution.264 Considering the Supreme Court of Japan’s deferential
approach to constitutional issues (including those surrounding Article 9) and
the role of the CLB in constitutional interpretation it is fair to ask whether
positions taken by the CLB in early opinions are entitled to a kind of “stare
decisis” affect at least until set aside by a new reasoned CLB opinion or the
judiciary or at least a reasoned legal explanation by the government.265
Rather than using the means provided by the Constitution to amend the
Constitution (or utilizing the CLB to reverse previous CLB opinions based
on a reasoned explanation) the LDP has “reinterpreted” Article 9 and while
it still wants to amend the language of Article 9, it no longer sees such
amendment as a priority. Rather, amendment to Article 9, which was for
many years the rallying call for constitutional amendment, can be relegated
to a future date, after other amendments have been approved by two-thirds
of each Diet and presented to the public for referendum vote.
CONCLUSION

III.

It is well to recall that it is constitutional amendment – a change in the
fundamental law that determines the relative powers of the executive, the
legislative and the people—not amendment of a statute that the LDP seeks.
The amendment language itself will have consequences for the people of
Japan that would change their current society, but more significant is the

264

Abe's collective self-defense argument just got shakier, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://3coco.org/a/modules/d3pipes_3/?page=clipping&clipping_id=12447.
265
Craig Martin, Questioning U.S. Support for Japan’s National Security Moves, CRAIG MARTIN:
TAKING LAW SERIOUSLY, (Sept. 7, 2015), http://craigxmartin.com/2015/09/questioning-u-s-support-forjapans-national-security-moves/; Craig Martin, Opinion, ‘Reinterpreting’ Article 9 endangers Japan’s rule
of law, JAPAN TIMES (June 7, 2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/06/27/commentary/japancommentary/reinterpreting-article-9-endangers-japans-rule-of-law/#.V42BZ4-cFy1.
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and the United
States response brought the issue of collective action and/or action outside of Japan to the fore. Japan,
under United States pressure, provided assistance to American forces in Iraq. Some portions of that
assistance were challenged in litigation that ended with a 2010 decision of the high court in Nagoya which
dismissed the case on technical grounds but opined in dicta that there had been a constitutional violation.
See, Mōri v. Japan: The Nagoya High Court Recognizes the Right to Live in Peace, Hudson Hamilton,
trans., 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 549 (2010); Allen Mendenhall, America Giveth, and America Taketh
Away: The Fate of Article 9 After the Futenma Base Dispute, 20 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 83 (2011). High
courts and district courts have frequently opined that an action violated the Constitution only to be reversed
by the Supreme Court so the dictum is far from definitive.

JANUARY 2017

Contemplated Amendments to Japan’s 1947 Constitution

73

removal of constitutional barriers to legislation and administrative action
that could dramatically and negatively affect the rights, liberties and
freedoms of citizens in modern Japan.
The considered amendments discussed in this article would
dramatically change the current Constitution from a document designed to
limit and regulate the power of the State vis a vis the people, to one that
emphasizes both the power and authority of the State and the duties and
obligations of citizens to the State as representative of the community of
Japanese citizens. The package of amendments the LDP is contemplating
and are discussed herein opens a path to reestablishment of the pre-war
Kokutai, the pre-war iye family system, and the pre-war autocratic state.
The government would be permitted to determine when and if the public
order required limitations on rights mentioned but not guaranteed by the
Constitution such as freedom of association and speech. As in pre-war
Japan, people could think what they want but the moment they
communicated such thoughts or organized to democratically make such
thoughts government policy, their “right” could terminate by determination
that such actions are not in the public interest or do not support public order.
The problem with the contemplated amendments as a package is not
simply that they reject fundamental human rights, free speech, and
constitutional limits on the governing elite and Cabinet once an emergency
has been declared—all of which are serious problems not to be
underestimated—but also that in many respects, the package would bring
Japanese governance (and society) back to the undemocratic Meiji
Constitution. In doing so, the amendments would sow the seeds for the
potential destruction of the form of democracy that the Japanese people are
continuing to develop to create a more representative state.266 As a whole,
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the amendments are not an attempt to create a twenty-first century postwar
Constitution, but rather to resurrect a flawed nineteenth century Constitution
based on myth and dreams of unique superiority.


articulate or follow policy positions in platforms—with little to no consequence in future elections.
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